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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia Military Affairs

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26 October 1994

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ARMED FORCES

Military Harvest Work in Moscow Area

95UM0028A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Maj-Gen Yevgeniy Mikhalko, chief of rear services for Moscow Military District, by Feliks Semyanovskiy: "The Army Is Digging Potatoes and Not Just for Itself: in Accordance with a Directive of the Chief of General Staff, Thousands of Soldiers of the Armed Forces of Russia Have Begun To Work in the Fields Around Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our correspondent speaks about this with the chief of the operational group of Moscow Military District for the organization of the work and cooperation with the administration of Moscow Oblast and the government of Moscow in the harvesting of potatoes and vegetables—with Maj-Gen Yevgeniy Mikhalko, chief of staff of rear services for the district.

[Semyanovskiy] Yevgeniy Lvovich, how many personnel are working in the fields of Moscow Oblast?

[Mikhalko] In carrying out the directives of our senior commanders, we involved 18,970 soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers in the work in the fields. Their number includes soldiers from Moscow Military District, cadets from military schools...

[Semyanovskiy] Where specifically are the military subunits working for the harvest?

[Mikhalko] They are working on farms in 10 rayons of Moscow Oblast: Dmitrovskiy, Serpukhovskiy, Voskresenskiy, Kashirskiy, Kliniskiy, Kolomenskiy, Lukhovitskiy, Ozerskiy, Stupinskiy, and Ramenskiy.

[Semyanovskiy] Since the subunits have left their places of permanent stationing, their living conditions are of considerable importance for them. How are things in this respect?

[Mikhalko] This is not the first year that we have worked to harvest potatoes and vegetables in the fields around Moscow. We have also gained a certain amount of experience in providing for the daily needs of personnel. When they went out to the rayons, the military subunits established themselves in engineer camps, recreation bases, and field camps, where the necessary conditions have been created for normal life, recreation, and the preparation and consumption of food.

[Semyanovskiy] Yevgeniy Lvovich, in past years conflicting situations sometimes arose in regard to the remuneration of the labor of service personnel. What standard rates have been set this year?

[Mikhalko] The Main Agricultural Directorate of Moscow Oblast set the following rates. For the completion of a standard shift, a soldier or sergeant receives 12,000 rubles and an officer gets 20,000. Supervising officers who organize the work and manage it receive 8 percent of the wages counted for all of the personnel of the subunit.

If you paid attention, it is only a matter of payment for the harvesting of potatoes and vegetables. But as the experience of past years has shown, in the course of their work the service personnel often must also deal with the packaging of

selected potatoes and vegetables and their sorting and loading on transport vehicles. And there are rates for this too. But for some reason they were often not considered in settling accounts with service personnel. We together with the Main Agricultural Directorate of Moscow Oblast are now trying to take the necessary measures to avoid such misunderstandings and the labor of service personnel was assessed in full and according to its merits.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Radiation Pollution From Tomsk Plant

95WN0015A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 40,
19-25 Oct 94 [Signed to press 18 Oct 94] p 7

[Article by Galina Mashtakova under "Sore Point" rubric: "ZATO Under Number Seven"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Mankind is doomed to technical progress. As long as his brain works, more and more new technologies will be created. And the more complex the technology is, the more potential harm it will bring for the health of the people. And whatever protective means are invented along with the technology, behind all of this is man with his head and his hands. After all, as Gennadiy Petrovich Khandorin, general director of the Siberian Chemical Combine [SCC], joked, "all accidents happen for one of two reasons: there is no contact where it should be or there is contact where it should not be."

Tomsk Oblast has been living in a state of emergency for several years now. The leadership of the SCC is frankly irritated by the ecological movement, in particular by "dilettantish" scientists. And naturally the scientists, who certainly earn unconditional respect on account of their professionalism and their interested and conscientious attitude, respond to this leadership with mistrust and suspicion. There is no contact where it is needed!

ZATO stands for "closed administrative-territorial formation." They are invisible cities and towns that are test ranges and nuclear complexes.... These "new formations" appeared in the body of the country about 40 to 50 years ago. The offspring of the military-industrial complex, they initially inspired respectful fear because of their secrecy and obscurity: What are they doing there behind several rows of barbed wire? But this was only at the beginning. The "secret physicists" bathed in the rays of their own glory and importance for only a short time. With time they themselves and then the rest of the population of the former power realized what might be the fruits of domestic technical progress with a clear militaristic tone. The time of the hangover arrived...

...I came to Tomsk for the first time in 1986. The city seemed to me like a kind of "blockade Leningrad." Doubled over in a bitter blizzard, men dragged sleds with large milk cans and women pulled smaller cans and vessels. My local colleagues explained to me that the water from the Tom was undrinkable. To the extent possible, the people got water from springs but even they are unsafe here, in a region of cedar forests burned by acid rains. But at home, in their kitchens, they talked about another Tomsk under the number seven and hidden behind seven seals in the taiga.

It was 6 April 1993 when there was a "failure of a technological apparatus" at the radiochemical plant of the SCC at Tomsk-7. In this apparatus, they were carrying out an operation to prepare to extract a uranium solution. There was an explosion with destruction of part of the building and the discharge of radioactive aerosols to the environment. The radioactive trail extended to the northeast from the SCC and crossed the northern motorway 28 km from Tomsk. As of 6 April, the strength of the dose of gamma rays on the contaminated section of the road reached 400 microroentgen/hour. It was 120-150 after decontamination. On the international scale of nuclear events, the accident was rated as a "serious incident." Initially the discharge at Tomsk-7 was estimated at up to 500 curie, then at 41, and the last figure was 115. At Chernobyl (for comparison), it was 50 million curie.

Nevertheless, a panic arose. The mistrust and fear that had developed over the years did their work. The flight of foreigners provoked "bottlenecks" of compatriots at the airport and railroad. In Kemerovo Oblast, they confused microroentgens with milliroentgens and they confused the Chernaya Rechka, where the discharge went, with the stream Bolshaya Chernaya on the border of the oblasts. There was a great deal of haste and precisely this showed the extent to which 500,000 citizens of Tomsk can be fully justified in considering themselves hostages of technical progress in the physical sense of this word. For the ancient university city of Tomsk is located just 12 km from the largest nuclear facility in Siberia—the SCC—which is involved in the production of weapons-grade plutonium, uranium, and transuranic elements. It includes a whole series of production processes that are potentially dangerous to the population and environment.

The city has one one single-track railroad, one motorway with the only bridge across the river Tom, and a small airport with a limited capacity. No comment is necessary, as they say.

It was precisely for this reason that the administration of the city, scientists and teachers at Tomsk higher educational institutions, medical people, and the public from various ecological organizations sounded the alarm. All of them are coming out in a single front in the fight against Tomsk-7, which has been renamed as the city of Seversk in honor of the victorious glasnost. On this side, the indisputable leader is Aleksandr Martynovich Adam, chairman of the oblast committee on ecology (he is deputy head of the oblast administration). On the other side of the ecological barricade is Professor Gennadiy Petrovich Khandorin, general director of SCC. And behind him is the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia and...technical progress, which cannot be stopped.

The fight developed around two still-unbuilt facilities at the SCC—a nuclear station (a joint Russian-American venture) and a depot for dismantled missile warheads brought here from throughout the country.

From a conversation with Valeriy Konyashkin, assistant to the chairman of the oblast committee on ecology:

"...They are now intentionally getting us used to the fact that the depot must be built because the 'materials' have already been delivered and they are not being stored properly. This is

blackmail. If they begin construction of the depot now, five or six years will pass and the 'materials' will still be stored...."

From a conversation with G. Khandorin: "It is my profound conviction that the 'greens' are working to crush the nuclear industry in Russia.... They want to listen only to themselves and are sowing panic.... This situation is more political than technical...."

Under the treaties on nuclear arms, we are removing warheads stuffed with plutonium from combat missiles. At the same time, however, we are continuing to "cook" plutonium for new warheads at at least three places—at a mining and chemical combine (at Krasnoyarsk-26), at the "Mayak" Scientific Production Association (Chelyabinsk-65), and at the SCC. There is rather reliable information that the stocks of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia amount to more than 140 tonnes, which is one and a half times the corresponding stocks of the United States. And how are these tonnes stored? As in Seversk? After all, a small critical mass of plutonium-239 can lead to a chain reaction—in other words, to a nuclear explosion in the wastes if there is a violation of the rules for their transportation and storage. Today the situation is such that a terrorist can seize a depot with containers (in which no one knows whether there are one, two, or three warheads) and...dictate his terms to the entire country. Thank God no one has yet thought of this and the facilities at the SCC are guarded properly. For example, they did not show me anything other than the site where the wastes of all categories of activity from the so-called chemical-metallurgical plant (facility No 25 in the local vernacular) found their final resting place.

From a conversation with Professor Leonid Rikhvanov, department head at Tomsk Polytechnical University:

"...The water supply is a problem for Tomsk. About 40 million cubic meters of radioactive wastes have been pumped into the ground and this is continuing. This is 17 km from the test range: in one section they are pumping and increasing the pressure but in another it is the opposite—the pressure is low and there are craters of depression.... They tell us that there is no migration of water and everything is staying at the test range and will never go anywhere. But geologists and hydrogeologists are asserting the opposite: there is no protective layer. They pump it into the lower layers and we drink from the middle layers...."

We need immediate and serious investigations. For we already have the sad experience of Krasnoyarsk-26, which hardly anyone knows about. They also decided to build a burial ground on the other bank of the Yenisey. The tunneled under the river at two levels. Underneath was a pipeline for wastes and above that the tunnel was for motor transport. Scientists showed the absurdity and danger of this measure. The result of this fight was the suspension of construction and the site was closed. Now the tunnel under the Yenisey remains as another monument to domestic mismanagement.

From a conversation with V. Konyashkin:

"...There is an international agreement on the nonimportation of nuclear wastes from abroad. And no country accepts these wastes. Then somehow they were able to get an amendment through the Supreme Soviet under which these are not wastes but secondary raw materials...."

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It as a matter of deliveries by the firm "Kozhema" of spent fuel from a French nuclear power station for enrichment at the SCC. Under the contract, the enriched product is returned to the home country and wastes from this production process remain here, at Tomsk-7, or Seversk, as it is now called.

From a conversation with G. Khandorin:

"...The Europeans are catching up with us in the technology for the separation of uranium isotopes and enrichment of the uranium product. We can lose orders. Yes, the money from "Kozhema" goes directly to the SCC. And every entrepreneur has the right to receive money for his work. It is not the oblast center that is receiving the money and this is disturbing them...."

It seems that the SCC has already lost one order. The SCC offered its services to the renowned west German firm Siemens for the reprocessing and modification of its uranium materials, which, in the words of G. Khandorin, had not even been irradiated. The deal was made but "someone had to ruin everything" and an article appeared in DER SPIEGEL to the effect that Germany was sending wastes to Russia and it is forbidden to bring in wastes.

From a conversation with G. Khandorin:

"...The Germans are now demanding confirmation that the people are working on their material safely. I told them to go to the devil! That is too much trouble. It is not your business what they do in Russia. We are giving you your material. If you do not like it, go to hell...."

Gennadiy Petrovich thinks that a "competing firm" interfered with their relations with Siemens. And these nervy Tomsk "greens" regularly interfere in the relations of the SCC with American atomic scientists. In the opinion of G. Khandorin and V. Mikhaylov, minister of atomic energy of Russia, a nuclear power station needs to be built at Tomsk-7. And in response to the objections of the "greens" that it is impossible to perform a Russian-American experiment precisely here, they say that the reactor is not experimental. Under their plans, a reactor of the new generation will simply be modernized. After all, one must do something with the plutonium produced by our country and by our American colleagues. And there is just one way to get rid of plutonium—load it into a nuclear reactor and burn it. Tomsk has an urgent need for electric power. It meets 75 percent of its needs at the expense of neighboring oblasts. This is expensive. The oblast enterprises are becoming uncompetitive. It would seem that it would be better for them to fire up a new reactor with dismantled warheads and thereby obtain cheap energy. But no, the ecologists stood like a wall.

They are not against technological progress. And I dare say that their goal is not to put an end to domestic nuclear energy. They and the population of Tomsk are concerned only about how safe it will be for them to have such a "gift" from America next to them (the United States is prepared to finance the construction of the nuclear power station at the SCC).

Because of the lack of federal financing, no measures have yet been taken for the social protection of the population living within a 30-km radius of the SCC. There is no

possibility of laying another railroad track from the Transiberian Line through Tomsk and there is no possibility of improving the motorways and establishing the necessary stock of the means for individual protection, medication, and emergency food supply. The government and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia must take the necessary measures and do everything that they can to ensure the safety of the people living in an area larger than some states. Otherwise who will benefit from the technological progress that has so generously spread its wings over the ZATO under the number seven, now called Seversk?

GROUND TROOPS

Role of New Generation Tank in Future Warfare

95UM0029A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev under rubric "Military Review": "Tanks in Wars of the 21st Century"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Articles appear more and more often in pages of the foreign press devoted to prospects for development of military affairs at the turn of the century, to military-strategic problems which must be solved in the next century, and to the newest means of warfare. And many are devoted to the future of tanks. As a rule, armored formations and units are considered the main striking force of ground troops in the offensive. The United States, for example, believes that in the years ahead their commanders must be guided by fundamental principles of the "air-land operation (battle)" concept—initiative, depth, speed and coordination of actions. And tanks along with aircraft are given the most important role in performing combat missions, inflicting maximum damage on the enemy and avoiding significant friendly troop losses.

No small role is set aside for armored formations and units in the defense as well. Thus, according to that same U.S. Army's regulations and other official documents, the general mission of the armored division in this kind of battle will continue to be to disrupt the enemy offensive by inflicting maximum damage on him, seize the initiative and create conditions for friendly troops to launch an attack. Similar missions are assigned to tanks in armies of other states as well.

The article by General Henri Paris in the French journal DEFENSE NATIONALE also should be included among numerous articles on the role of tanks and armored troops in modern war and their future. Its author at one time commanded the 2nd Armored Division, and now writes as a military expert. The propositions he develops largely coincide with the views of a number of prominent western military theorists.

Like many other authors, Paris in particular proceeds from the assumption that mankind still is destined to encounter more than once armed conflicts of varying intensity and in various regions of the world. New forms of combat operations connected with humanitarian operations or peace-making missions acquire ever greater importance. And the general believes armored troops will play the leading role here as before.

It is common knowledge that the tank's combat capabilities are characterized by three main parameters—firepower, armor protection and mobility. The proper choice of these parameters and their well balanced combination is an extraordinarily difficult problem. For example, strengthening

armor protection leads to increased vehicle weight and must be compensated by greater engine power and so on. It always must be remembered that armor guarantees the crew's relative safety, and firepower and mobility guarantee its combat effectiveness.

Country	Russia	United States	Germany	UK	France
Tank	T-80U	M1A1 Abrams	Leopard 2	Challenger	Leclerc
Crew	3	4	4	4	3
Combat weight, t	46	63	55.1	62	54
Engine power, hp	1,250	1,500	-	1,200	1,500
Speed, km/hr:					
Highway	70	76	70	56 (maximum)	75
Offroad	48	48	40	-	-
Armor	-	Multilayered to 500 mm	Multilayered to 500 mm	Multilayered to 600 mm	-
Armament	125-mm smoothbore gun, coaxial machinegun, anti-aircraft machinegun	120-mm smooth-bore gun, 3 machineguns	120-mm smooth-bore gun	120-mm rifled gun, 2 machine-guns	120-mm smoothbore gun, coaxial machinegun, anti-aircraft machinegun

With all his adherence to tanks, General Paris proceeds from the assumption that they cannot successfully operate independently in modern battle and need air support, and the best means for such support is not an aircraft, but a helicopter. Maneuverability (which permits executing tactical missions by taking advantage of terrain relief features), armor protection, and firepower of the combat helicopter essentially compensate for its vulnerability. Having provided helicopter support, it is also possible to find the most successful combinations of the main parameters of tanks themselves.

The Americans are the most consistent in this respect. They do not limit themselves to discourse on supporting armored formations and units from the air, but directly include an Army aviation brigade in the makeup of the armored division along with tanks and infantry brigades and battalions as well as artillery. The division commander assigns the mission to it and directs its operations.

Western military experts are practically unanimous in saying that the nature of future armed conflicts inevitably will be affected by the fact that the majority of countries, including those of the third world, have acquired or are acquiring modern, high-tech weapons that concede little to arms of the most developed states. Consequently, in a local conflict in some godforsaken area any one of those states may encounter an enemy capable of conducting combat operations such as those for which they were preparing in the center of Europe just quite recently during the 1970's and 1980's. And this underscores even more the role of armored troops in future armed conflicts.

The mobility and firepower of armored formations in combination with wide air support presume a maneuverable ground battle which takes on features common to a naval or air battle. Right after the Americans with their "air-land operations," that is what General Paris and other western military theorists believe. Motionless, stationary combat formations are disappearing into the past. Even the defense demands a more and more flexible maneuver. According to widespread notions, this leads in the final account to the disappearance of a concept such as a front line.

All these factors dictate the need for armored formations of a combined-arms nature, permitting the establishment of operational-tactical groups as necessary and depending on the nature of maneuver. These groups need both heavy tanks as well as light reconnaissance vehicles. They have become especially widespread in the U.S. Army, where it is believed that light tanks are intended for performing tactical reconnaissance and combat security, providing fire support to combat operations of reconnaissance subunits, and supporting communications and coordination of troops. Their use in fighting main battle tanks and destroying enemy strongpoints and defensive works also is not precluded.

And so reconnaissance subunits must possess operational mobility and heavy weapon subunits intended for delivering strikes must have tactical mobility and formidable firepower. An outline of the modern organic armored formation appears on this basis. In the opinion of many people, it is necessary to provide for two types of such formations—the typical armored formation and the airmobile formation.

Just what conclusion can be drawn from all that has been said? The wide spread of high-tech weapons with increased firepower also presumes the corresponding nature of the potential enemy. Armored equipment, especially the tank, retains its significance not only in the present, but also in the future in armed conflicts which may arise in the 21st century. The wide use of armored forces has not changed methods of combat operations, but the problem is to find the necessary correlation among firepower, maneuverability and armor protection. Today's combat effectiveness of armored troops and prospects for their development and employment also depend on how successfully such a correlation is found.

NAVAL FORCES

Kuznetsov Air Wing Said To Be Operational

95UM0026B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Pavel Maslov under rubric "Report for the Issue": "Admiral Kuznetsov: Path to the Ocean Is Open"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *That which occurred aboard the heavy air-capable cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov in late August and early September of this year can be called the chief gift of the Russian military to the Russian Navy tricentennial: for the first time in our Navy's history, a ship on which horizontal takeoff and landing aircraft are based began combat work to the full extent.*

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has informed readers regularly about the progress of work to place the heavy air-capable cruiser in formation. Let us recall how it all happened. Following the cruiser's transit to the Northern Fleet, all ship systems, especially radiotechnical systems, began operating as authorized, as they say, thanks to efforts of the Navy command and the selflessness of navymen headed by the cruiser's commander, Captain 1st Rank Ivan Sanko. The crew mastered operation and tested the ship under real conditions. At the same time, state tests of Su-27K aircraft were nearing their conclusion. Twenty-four series aircraft entered the Northern Fleet Air Force.

The only things lacking were line pilots ready for flight operations under ship conditions. The reason for that is known—the inventory of the Army and Navy of the USSR and later also of Russia never had ships of that type. There were only cruisers carrying helicopters and VTOL aircraft.

And for the time being only one pilot of Northern Fleet aviation had experience in landing on a cruiser. This was Colonel Timur Apakidze, who at one time served at the Naval Aviation Pilot Training Center in Saki. After the Center passed under Ukraine's jurisdiction, Apakidze requested a transfer to the Northern Fleet, to where the cruiser was being rebased. And he "took away" with him a group of the very same obsessed ship-based pilots, who became the backbone of the newly created fighter regiment of Northern Fleet ship-based aviation.

A program for the regiment's young pilots to master the Su-27K was worked out with Apakidze's involvement. Planned preparation for flights to the ship began. The Naval Aviation command gave the "green light" for this group's flight operations. Testers of the Air Force GLITs [State Flight Test Center] gave them "shelter" under polar night conditions.

For better quality of pilot training, with the help of Rosvooruzheniye GK [State Company] and the Air Force Ordering Directorate, they succeeded in concluding a contract with the Ukrainian Air Force and demothballing the NITKA training complex at Saki airfield, which was beginning to rust.

The sky over the airfield buzzed for more than a month, as in the good old days. People on the Air Force post joked on this account that children finally began sleeping quietly when the aircraft engines were roaring over their heads as usual. The amount of work done at Saki simply is astonishing: there were 1,650 passes over the unit, 696 with touchdown, 99 engagements of the cable, and 43 takeoffs from the ski jump.

After becoming familiar with the progress of practices, the Naval Aviation command made the decision about readiness of the first ten pilots for landing on a ship. Then 31 August arrived. Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev

and Naval Aviation Commander Lieutenant General of Aviation Vladimir Deyneka arrived aboard the cruiser, which was in the Barents Sea. On this day three pilots of the ship-based regiment landed on the ship for the first time. One had to see the faces of these three pilots, who had awaited their "hour of triumph" for more than four years!

In the course of several days all other pilots of Apakidze's group tried out the ship's deck. These were colonels Ivan Bokhonko and Yaroslav Chibir; lieutenant colonels Igor Kozhin, Viktor Dubovoy, Konstantin Kochkarev and Genadiy Ryzhov; Major Pavel Podguzov; and captains Yevgeniy Kuznetsov and Andrey Abramov.

At the same time, the first ship landings were made in the Su-27K by Air Force GLITs test pilots lieutenant colonels Aleksandr Ivanov, Vyacheslav Petrusha, Vyacheslav Kritskiy and Sergey Bogdan.

Experienced "ship-based pilots" of the Sukhoi OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] Viktor Pugachev, Sergey Melnikov and Nikolay Alferov were the mentors of these pilots.

Also making their first landings on the cruiser in the Su-25 UTG trainer were Lieutenant General of Aviation Vladimir Deyneka, Naval Aviation commander; Lieutenant General of Aviation Nikolay Rogov, his first deputy; Major General of Aviation Nikolay Mordovalov, Northern Fleet Air Force commander; and Major General of Aviation Yuriy Klishin, chief of the Air Force GLITs.

Today it can be said with full confidence that the heavy air-capable cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov is ready for distant ocean deployments and for performance of missions to the full extent, which was confirmed by a tactical air exercise from the ship with the participation of six Su-27K's.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Deputy Dobrovolskaya on Efforts To Improve Social Protection

95UM0030B Moscow ORIENTIR in Russian No 9, Sep 1994 [Signed to press 1 Sep 94] pp 43-46

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Marina Dobrovolskaya by Lt Col Nikolay Kartashov under "Social Protection" rubric: "I Am Particularly Concerned About the People With Shoulder Boards"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kartashov] Marina Karamanovna, your name has been talked about for several years now. And they began to talk about you after a Union of Navy Women was established in the Russian Armed Forces. You were entrusted with leading it.

[Dobrovolskaya] Yes, this event took place a little more than two years ago. At the founding conference, in the work of which women delegates from all the fleets took part, a decision was made to establish our union. And the reason we did this was concern about the resolution of many accumulated problems, particularly social problems. Our union is registered in the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and has a federal and all-Russian status. Its divisions are found in the large cities and garrisons where naval forces are based. The union brings together women now serving in the military as well as the wives of servicemen and women working at military enterprises and

institutions. We accept in our ranks all those who are concerned about problems in the navy and we do not exclude men who are providing real assistance.

We work exclusively under social principles, that is, free of charge. This was resolved even at the founding conference. For this reason, one cannot help but admire the self-sacrificing spirit with which our women are working. They include Lidiya Kuranova from Port-Vladimir, Alla Krivoruchko from Gadzhiyev, Lyudmila Mironova from Severomorsk, Emma Silayeva from Sevastopol, Irina Makarova from Baltiysk, and others.

Our plans include above all the resolution of urgent social questions and the provision of legal assistance to the families of service members. We have developed and are realizing the charitable programs "Children" and "Widows." We are also cooperating with veterans' organizations and other movements. We are preparing to create centers for legal support to women and also for their employment and retraining. It is essential to restore the best traditions of the family recreation clubs at the garrisons. Officers rarely see their families and there is nothing surprising about the fact that they want to have some pleasant times with their wives and children.

As of today our union is the first and only social organization that is officially registered in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. But as they say, a person alone in the field is not a soldier....

[Kartashov] Are you satisfied with the results of the union's work and has it met your expectations?

[Dobrovolskaya] We determined for ourselves what the people need and this is the main thing. I already said that we do not earn any money and therefore it is sponsors who provide us with funding for specific measures. In particular, they have transferred considerable sums to pay for the care of children at sanatoria and rest homes. Thanks to the help of the naval command, we received the permission of the Supreme Military Council of the navy to use military transport aircraft to take the children to the places of their recreation. When hostilities arose in the Caucasus, we participated in the evacuation of the children of naval officers. I also was in that hot region at the time. A real war was going on there. Later, in Moscow, someone asked me why I flew there and took an unnecessary risk. But how could I do otherwise? After all, women and children were in trouble there.

It may be that what I am saying is not such a big thing. But you must agree that today by no means every family, and especially a young family, can afford to send children to the south: tickets are expensive and many health resorts in the Crimean and Caucasus have been lost to us. It is not just that a child living in the north, for example, cannot see the sun and fruit but he also cannot go anywhere during the summer. The sole recreation camp that the Northern Fleet has cannot meet all of the requests.

Or take the organization of charitable holidays for children from large families of fleet officers and warrant officers and for disabled children. On the average, a ticket to a children's holiday costs six thousand. At first glance this is a small sum. But if there are two or more children in the family and

the wife does not work.... Even 100 such tickets amount to 600,000 and we have to come up with this money for dozens of such charitable measures.

To speak of veterans, we work in close contact with the veteran's council of the navy, with Valentin Nikolayevich Gagarkin from the Moscow Veterans' Council, where there is also a women's section. Thank God that wonderful women are still alive in the navy who participated in the Great Patriotic War: pilots, navigators, and physicians. Our task is to give them some joy at least sometimes and to make their difficult life better through concern and attention....

[Kartashov] With all of your work load, what was it that caused you to fight for a deputy's place in the Duma?

[Dobrovolskaya] I was offended by the fact that the level of social protection of some categories of service members and persons discharged from military service has now fallen to a critical point. Someone must defend their interests. After all, there are only a few military people in parliament. And I know about the problems of people with shoulder boards not just by hearsay. My husband is a serviceman. Before coming to the Duma, I myself worked for 13 years in the Main Staff of the navy. During that time I visited all of the fleets and most of the remote garrisons. And even now I meet no less frequently with military people and their family members, especially since in the Defense Committee I head a subcommittee on the rights of service members.

One of my recent trips, for example, was to the Pacific Fleet. There I was surprised by the following situation. The mother of an officer, a captain second rank, died on the mainland. And he did not even have the money to buy an airplane ticket—the servicemen in this military unit have not been paid for several months. And what does it mean for a military man to be without a ruble in his pocket? After all, his wages are the only means of survival for him and his family.

It is a bitter and vexing fact that by no means all the people in our society, including the statesmen in the government and Duma, know about the impoverished state of the defenders of our Fatherland. Some of them still have the idea that servicemen have plenty of money and that their wives and children have no needs. Meanwhile, 70 percent of officers and their family members have an income less than that of other social groups. Here are some other figures. More than 100,000 servicemen do not have apartments and their wives cannot find work. Thousands of families are experiencing ongoing difficulties with medical services and so on. At the same time, some people think that all of the problems in our state come from the large size of the army and the exorbitant expenditures for it. It is probably correct that the army needs to be reduced to reasonable limits, which is being done. But those who are leaving the armed forces for the reserves and those who are staying in them must be socially protected. Here it often happens the other way around—military people find themselves in the role of the abused and humiliated. That is the sad picture in a few words....

[Kartashov] Still, what, in your view, must be done to overcome this critical situation?

[Dobrovolskaya] Certainly it can be overcome. But the basic problem involves the financing of the armed forces. Remember the number of copies in parliament in the review and approval of the federal budget for 1994! The members

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of our committee and representatives of the Ministry of Defense made a great effort at that time to have the appropriations for defense made in the necessary quantity. During this period we had a lot of meetings with deputies of different parliamentary groups. We prepared for them a lot of materials on the critical state of the defense industry and the impoverished position of service members. There were special parliamentary hearings on the problems in the social protection of military people. Representatives from the ministries of finance and economics and other departments were invited to the hearings. Unfortunately, however, our voice remained that of the one crying in the....

I admit that it was a bitter experience to hear from the mouths of esteemed colleagues statements to the effect that we do not need either submarines or aircraft and that military people ought not to complain about life.... Many deputies simply were unable to understand the necessity of a more serious, realistic, and, let me be frank, broader approach to this vitally important question. The Duma passed the budget prepared by the Government of the Russian Federation. As a result, the realization of many social programs is actually threatened, in particular the program for the construction of housing. Last year, when the construction of 82,000 apartments was planned, actually 20,000 fewer were built on account of a shortage of funding. The money allocated for capital construction this year permits the building of only 40 percent of the number of apartments planned. One cannot even speak of medical services, cultural and domestic services, and so on.

[Kartashov] So service personnel and the members of their families must tighten their belts even more and continue to "bear the difficulties and adversities of military service steadfastly"?

[Dobrovolskaya] I would not put it that way. The government assured the deputies that the army will be financed through nonbudgetary means. This gives a certain amount of hope. We on our part are also working in this direction. The committee has developed and reviewed a draft law on the sale of released military equipment, property, and fixed capital of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. If this document is passed and goes into effect, then the armed forces will obtain a significant increase in money. In addition, we have already established favorable conditions for the realization of special social programs for servicemen in the territory of Russia to be implemented through foreign investments. As far as I know, legislative acts having to do with the social support of service members are also being prepared in the committees on labor and social support and on the affairs of women and young people.

[Kartashov] Various funds and organizations could also help the armed forces to resolve social problems. What do you think?

[Dobrovolskaya] No one is against the existence of such funds. The Fatherland is now going through hard times. And if in our unstable time every fund would materially help, say, a large family of an officer or the widow of a deceased serviceman, then this would mean that tens or hundreds of families would have fewer problems in life.

[Kartashov] You are head of the subcommittee on the rights of service members. In essence, you are on the edge, if I can

put it this way, of the most critical problems. Are you and your colleagues having success in resolving them?

[Dobrovolskaya] Let us be frank and say that my position is not one to be envied, as indicated by the name of the subcommittee. We are continually getting letters and complaints. We are not leaving them unattended. We are looking into them and taking measures. My position here is unequivocal. Life in the army and its state of health must be defined by law and only by law, which everyone must obey.

But service members are appealing to us not only with their pains and concerns. Some of them are making specific proposals on the improvement of the legislative base and are insisting on the necessity of passing new legislative acts that would strengthen the legal protection of service members and would make it possible to establish legal order in the army and navy. By the way, taking into account the wishes of voters, our committee prepared a number of documents involving the social and legal support of service members. In particular, the State Duma passed the bill "On the Procedures for the Provision of Military and Civilian Personnel of the Russian Federation for Participation in Operations to Support or Restore International Peace and Security and Other Forms of Peacekeeping Activities." A bill was also prepared "On Alternative Civilian Service." We held parliamentary hearings on the social protection of service members and persons discharged from military service, on deaths and injuries in the armed forces, on the reform of the army and navy....

Certainly we still have much work to do on a legislative base for service members. There is a large field for work here. Even those legislative acts that already exist need refinement and supplementation. Until now, for example, we have not settled the questions of the granting of privileges in the area of taxation, the right to visit sanatoria and health resorts, and the provision of free financial help for the construction and acquisition of housing and compensation for expenditures for the building of apartments. Only an insignificant share of the legal norms included in the legislation have the nature of direct norms. To support the work of the law "On the Status of Service Members," it is necessary to make changes in 4 codes and more than 10 profile laws and to pass more than 40 legal acts. As I have already said, there is a large field for work. But we committee members agree on one thing: it is essential as soon as possible to restore in the society and state the former respect for the defenders of the Fatherland and for their difficult military labor.

[Kartashov] It was not so long ago that parliamentary hearings were held in the Duma on problems having to do with deaths and injuries in the armed forces. It is well known that there were specific plans for work to prevent "concombat" losses of service members. But is it not so that these good intentions are remaining on paper only?

[Dobrovolskaya] I want to note right away that these were very complex hearings. After all, we were talking about "noncombat" losses, which are unacceptable. As far as I know, such losses in our army amounted to 518 men in the first half of 1994. They included 73 officers, 20 warrant officers, and 22 contract personnel. The rest were soldiers in compulsory service. And if one takes those service members killed in the border troops, internal forces of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Emergency Situations, Federal

Counterintelligence Service, and Federal Agency for Government Communications, then the losses are significantly greater. Overall we are all guilty of the fact that such tragedies occur. In my view, their prevention requires the efforts of everyone: us legislators, the mothers of soldiers, commanders and chiefs, workers of the procurator's office.... For the time being, unfortunately, there are no unified approaches to the resolution of this problem. Still, the ice has been broken. People have now begun to speak openly about a problem that was once concealed. This means that there is much that must change.

[Kartashov] Today many Russians, including service members, are especially concerned about the fate of those of our compatriots who involuntarily found themselves in the republics of Transcaucasia and the Baltic countries. Thousands of military pensioners and members of their families became "superfluous persons" there. It is extremely hard to accept this.

[Dobrovolskaya] Our subcommittee is also concerned about this problem. Here we are working in cooperation with the committees for CIS affairs and relations with compatriots. We do not have the right to abandon our veterans. And there can be no doubt that we are defending and will continue to defend their interests based on the provisions of laws and international norms.

[Kartashov] Because you are a woman, in this connection I would like to touch on the theme of women in the service. In recent times, they have literally "inundated" the armed forces and, as one might expect, many different problems have arisen in their path....

[Dobrovolskaya] In general, I am ambiguous about the fact that women are serving in the army. And this is why. By no means all of them wanted to go there or felt called. Many of them put on the military uniform and became sailors or soldiers out of need, because there is no other work at remote garrisons. I know many women with a prestigious education who were forced to become warehouse workers, clerks, plotters.... Well, such is life today. Of course our dear female friends also have plenty of problems.

Take medical care. Basically our military medical institutions are intended for men. But any right-thinking person understands that where women service members serve or wives of servicemen live other kinds of medical specialists are needed. And there is another problem. After all, a woman in the army is still a woman. And therefore she must be elegant and attractive. Alas, we have not yet been able to establish more or less tolerable conditions for this.

[Kartashov] As you yourself noted, your position is not an enviable one. Does the fact that you are a woman help you in your work?

[Dobrovolskaya] Normal relations with people are what really help. One must simply love them more.

[Kartashov] It is probably a difficult thing to be a woman in any country—with the family, the children, and the household. It is even more difficult when the woman is also a politician. How does your husband relate to the fact that you are constantly on trips and return home late?

[Dobrovolskaya] He understands me and is concerned about me. He likes to joke about the fact that he works as the husband of a deputy of the State Duma.

[Kartashov] Thank you for the interview.

Problems With Residential Construction for Servicemen

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[Article by Aleksandr Prasol: "Control of the Housing Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The avalanche of nonpayments throughout Russia is threatening to become a serious obstacle to the resolution of the problem of financing the construction of housing for servicemen. The local authorities are in no hurry to carry out decisions on the allocation of housing for servicemen. And the possibilities of the military construction organizations are presently limited not only in connection with the lack of funding but also with respect to a shortage of personnel. In this connection, the Ministry of Defense made a decision also to involve "civilian" organizations in the building of garrisons in the Moscow area. One of these organizations is the joint-stock company "Ruzskiy Dom."

The Tuchkovo combine, on the basis of which the joint-stock company was organized, was able to erect "turnkey" dwelling houses and social and cultural facilities at construction sites in almost half of Moscow Oblast. The planned capacity of the complex is 120,000 square meters of housing space a year. And this amounts to 15 average four-entrance nine-story buildings.

Alas, the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing just about put the combine on the verge of ruin. But it came to neither bankruptcy nor to a shutdown of production. The joint-stock company found the way out for itself and for military personnel in the person of a solid customer, the Ministry of Defense. "Ruzskiy Dom" obligated itself to build housing at state rates, agreeing to take on the most difficult tasks—pipelines and the heating and engineering networks.

The corresponding documents were signed in June of last year. In a short time the people at Tuchkovo prepared all of the technical documentation and began to build the houses. The following fact shows the pace of the work: the decision to involve the joint-stock company "Ruzskiy Dom" in military contracts was made in the middle of the year and by the end of the year they turned over houses in Alabin, Naro-Fominsk, and Tuchkovo. But it continued that way only until they counted the money. As of today customers in the person of the corresponding agencies of the Ministry of Defense owe "Ruzskiy Dom" more than 2.5 billion rubles.

The result was that in Tuchkovo itself they had to mothball a house for which they had already hooked up pipelines, electricity, and heating and they just had to do some finishing work. At the aviation installation in Kubinka, they destroyed the barracks in which several families were housed and dug the foundation pits and that is where they stopped. There are nearly a dozen such long-term construction projects.

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The housing authorities of Moscow and Moscow Military District are alarmed: unfinished houses and those left open to the winter weather will inevitably begin to fall apart. Their hopes are on the financial agencies, whereas theirs, in turn, are on the government that provides the money and on the legislators who divide up and revise the country's budget.

Of course financial problems can completely disrupt any undertaking. But parliament dedicated a separate line of the state budget to the construction of housing for servicemen, thereby giving it a special status. And in June of this year, the government passed a special decree with the number 745 that provided for advances for contract work at construction facilities for federal state needs. In particular, it permitted the use of funds of local budgets and industrial enterprises for these purposes.

There are also nonbudgetary sources of financing construction, including revenue from the sale of military equipment and property. It is also possible to attract the funds of outside investors through the participation of shareholders in the construction of housing. And "Ruzskiy Dom" and other contract organizations that are able to build in a short time and with high quality will be able to do their part.

"I am certain that these are temporary difficulties and lack of coordination," says Vladimir Vasyants, general director of the joint-stock company "Ruzskiy Dom." "We will survive them. Of course our heart aches for own enterprise but even more so for the people in field overcoats whose families can hardly wait for their own roof over their heads. And I do not understand how the state can treat the army this way. It would be good if the parliamentarians could get away from their concerns for even one day and visit the garrisons to see the conditions under which military families are living and how many service premises even in so-called 'elite' units are being used for temporary housing. This is simply a shame for a power...."

It is difficult to add anything to that.

Lt-Gen Radionov on Military Education Reforms

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[Article by Lt-Gen Gennadiy Radionov: "Military Education Today and Tomorrow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The third training year has begun in military educational institutions under conditions of reform of military education. The strategy of reform has been determined. The primary problems have been resolved or are in the resolution stage, and preparation is under way for the most important stage, the transition to teaching in new specialties, in accordance with new study plans and curricula. Nonetheless, in the pedagogical collectives and VUZ [higher educational institution] administrations, controversies regarding the ways to implement reform, and the necessity and soundness of particular transformations, have still not died down. Many questions also go to the Directorate of Military Education of the Defense Ministry. With this article I shall try to respond to the most important of them.

The Basic Tasks and Conditions of Reform

Historical experience shows that all great reforms of military education have been carried out in Russia as a component part of reform of her Army.

So it was in the time of Peter I, during the Milyutin reforms of the second half of the 19th century, and in the military reform of 1924-1925. The present reform, which was started by the creation of the Russian Armed Forces, is no exception.

The **first and main task** is simultaneously with organization of the Russian Armed Forces, to form a system of military education adequate to them, and to raise it to a qualitatively new level which ensures radical enhancement of professionalism and of the general culture of the military cadres. The need for reform is also indicated by analysis of the work of the military educational institutions, the results of state examinations and the service experience of graduates in the line units. Such analysis demonstrates that many omissions in the work of the VUZ and defects in training of graduates are repeated from year to year. Evidently these defects are the consequence not only of failures of the command and instructional staff of the VUZ, but also of the imperfection of the system of military education itself.

The **need for reform** is also based on the fact that the system of training of military cadres is a necessary component part of the higher school of the country, which is also presently undergoing profound and comprehensive reformation. The Law "On Education" has been adopted in Russia, and state educational standards are being devised and introduced into practice. One of the main directions of reform here is diversification of higher education. It provides for a multiplicity of types of educational institutions and ways of obtaining education, the duration and content of education, and the introduction of a new multilevel structure of higher education. For this reason, the integration of military education into this structure, and the adapting of the life and activity of military educational institutions to the new state norms and principles of the law are very important tasks of the reform now in progress.

Finally, the great dynamism of development of military science and the rapid change-over of arms and military equipment demands a constant accumulation of knowledge and practical skills of officers. Concern for maintaining their professionalism throughout their service places on the agenda the question of a consistent transition to continuous military education in the reform process.

The basic directions of reform were defined by the Concept of Development of the System of Military Education, which was approved by RF Defense Ministry Order No 191, 1993. The concept marks the development of military education as one of the priority directions of military development. (Footnote *) (See the article on the "Concept of Development of the System of Military Education, page 58.)

But if the reform strategy has been marked out, its ways of realization require not only further profound treatment, but also constant ongoing adjustment. The tactics of actions here will largely be determined by the specific conditions of development of the Armed Forces, and the dynamically changing socioeconomic situation in the country. For this reason, the process and first results of reform cannot be considered apart from these specific conditions and their specific features.

The **first and important specific feature** is that, as I stress, the issue is precisely one of reform rather than creation of a new system of training of officer cadres. The Armed Forces of

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Russia have a quite developed system of military education, with a quite strong scientific and pedagogic potential, a developed and expensive infrastructure and up-to-date training facilities. They possess rich historical experience and traditions of training. In defining the ways to realize reform, we must rely first of all on the experience and traditions of the Russian military school, and objectively evaluate its strong points and deficiencies. Without a doubt, it is necessary to reasonably utilize everything that is good in world practice, but we must not blindly copy foreign models.

The **second specific feature** of conduct of reform is associated with the profound socioeconomic crisis that Russia is going through today. Reform proceeds under conditions of economic decline. Defense appropriations have been cut sharply, and the requirement to reduce the number of military educational institutions has acquired the force of law. Simultaneously with the reduction in the army and navy, the redeployment of large groupings of troops is under way, and this also involves great financial expenditures. The material and financial status of the VUZ has worsened. Essentially capital construction has been frozen, and the training and laboratory facilities are not being renovated. For this reason, in defining the scope and nature of transformations, we must proceed from the real economic, demographic and other capabilities of the state in the near future and in the long term.

And the **third specific feature**, which organizers of all previous reforms could scarcely have encountered, is the sharp drop in prestige of education in the country. Its causes include the lack of demand for knowledge in society, and the worsened economic status of specialists with higher education. As a result the interest in study drops, and the level of preparedness of graduates of secondary schools is diminishing. And the position of military educational schools is further complicated by the reduction in prestige of military service itself, which also has a negative effect on recruitment of VUZ cadets, and on the effectiveness of the educational process. These are the realities of our time, and they cannot be ignored today.

Let us consider the tasks and ways of realization of reform of military education in three of its most important directions.

Optimization of the Network and Capacity of Military Educational Institutions

Its task is to adapt the inventory and capacity of the VUZ to the new structure and numerical strength of the Russian Armed Forces, and to the real requirement of line units and naval forces for officer cadres.

Much has already been done. Reform and redeployment of a whole group of VUZ have already been completed. Seven military schools have been eliminated, and the capacity of all the remaining VUZ has been adjusted. Training of officers in many shortage specialties has been organized. At the same time, calculations show that the developed network of military academic institutions exceeds the requirements of the one-and-a-half-million-strong Armed Forces.

There is no doubt that a further reduction in the number of VUZ is required, but what are the ways to resolve this

problem? Several approaches have been planned for reducing the network of military educational institutions.

One of them is to try at any price to reduce each of the existing VUZ by a proportional reduction in its capacity. This approach cannot be considered advisable, since it leads to a grinding-down of VUZ and a drop in their scientific potential, and this has a negative affect on the quality of training of graduates and increases the cost of their education.

Opposing this, it has been proposed that large educational complexes of services and combat arms be created, with a capacity of up to five thousand students or more, to replace the existing VUZ. To concentrate basically the theoretical education in them, and to create field educational centers for practical training of the graduates. Such systems have developed historically in a number of countries, and in principle they do not arouse objections. But under our conditions the proposed reorganization would require gigantic capital investments, the construction of entire complexes of educational buildings and living quarters, the virtual re-creation of laboratory facilities, and the transfer and accommodation of many thousands of officer families. Such a breakup is hardly justified and hardly within the capabilities of Russia today.

The only acceptable thing appears to me to be a reasonable and solicitous attitude toward that which has been bequeathed to the Russian Armed Forces. A well-founded cadre order for training of officers in each speciality must be the starting basis for optimization of the network of military educational institutions, and a reduction in the number of VUZ based on their rational consolidation must be its main direction.

Consolidation of military educational institutions must be effected on the basis of their integration, the creation of educational complexes combining the training of military cadres of various types and levels of education, of various combat arms and services. In the course of integration, a merging of like or related VUZ can be provided for. Small VUZ that lose their scientific potential can be reorganized into faculties of related military or even civilian higher educational institutions, giving them the opportunity to "lean on" the larger natural-science and special departments of the head VUZ. As a result the capacity of military schools must be no smaller than 1200 to 1500 cadets, except for the aviation schools for pilots, whose capacity can be significantly smaller in connection with the restriction of air space.

Military academies, which must if possible be preserved as training-methods and scientific centers of services and combat arms, require special attention and concern in the course of optimization. The combining of academies of even one armed service demands a weighed and cautious approach. It seems advisable to expand and in some academies to renew the training of officers from among the cadets and to consider the possibility of including military institutes (schools, officer courses, classes) within the academies as affiliates or faculties.

Other principles as well may be made the basis for consolidation of VUZ. But in each of them, the main idea must be realized: to reduce educational expenses without reducing quality, to assist the VUZ in surviving by combining the efforts of related pedagogical collectives, by strengthening of

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departments, and through the joint use of field and laboratory facilities. Mechanical combining of completely different VUZ, having no common scientific technical or technical foundation, is the sole unacceptable action.

Integration of the system of training of military cadres into a multi-level structure of higher education was introduced in Russia in 1992. The main advantage of the new multi-level (or more precisely three-level) structure is that it does away with nothing in the historically developed system of higher education of the country, but only supplements it. I shall dwell on this in more detail.

The **first level** and diploma of incomplete higher education is received by a person who finishes two VUZ grades, and then over one to one-and-a-half years obtains professional practical training in the amount of a technical school or technical trade school.

The **second level** and baccalaureate diploma is obtained by graduates with a normative period of education of four years. The baccalaureate degree will basic a basic higher education over very broad areas, covering up to 10 or more specialties each. Suffice to say that for 267 specialists of engineer and technical profiles, there are just 36 areas of training of baccalaureates in the field of technical sciences. While providing good fundamental education, the baccalaureate degree does not provide for training in a specific specialty and therefore the baccalaureate recipient is practically unready for independent work directly upon graduation from the VUZ. Additional efforts and additional time are required for him to master a specific profession.

The **third stage** of higher education is essentially the existing system of training of degreed specialists with a period of education of 5 to 6 years. The third level also includes the masters degree, which will prepare specialists primarily for science-intensive and research work. The period of education is no less than six years. It must be stressed that only the third level corresponds to full higher education, and only it gives the right to enter civilian or military postgraduate study.

Now the Defense Ministry has resolved a fundamentally important question: With the new Statute on Higher Military Educational Institutions, which was put in effect by RF Defense Ministry Order No 110. 1994, the place of military education within this multi-level structure was precisely defined. **Training of degreed specialists with higher education, corresponding to education of the third level, is the cornerstone of military education.** In other words, that system of military education which we have today and which has been reliably tested by the experience of the Russian Armed Forces is basically retained.

The third level of higher education is achieved both by graduates intended, upon graduation, to occupy primary officer positions, and by students of military academies who are intended for positions at the level of regiment and higher, as a rule. Military academies, without officially raising the educational requirement of their graduates, will confer a second higher education of the same third level, but in a fundamentally different, administrative speciality. Here the Defense Ministry is keeping the customary terms of "higher military" and "higher military-special" education, characterizing the scope and nature of the activity for which the VUZ graduate is prepared.

Masters studies will also be organized at military educational institutions for targeted training of officers in science-intensive, research and science-teaching work. The position on masters work is being developed. It will be set up only in the leading VUZ, which possess high scientific potential and a modern research base. The masters candidates will be trained both from among the cadets and from among the officer students, but in both cases the base higher education in the amount of the baccalaureate will be the foundation for masters studies. If someone entering masters studies does not have a baccalaureate degree, he must pass entrance examinations in the appropriate volume.

As for the baccalaureate, its introduction is largely due to the appearance of an open labor market, which the civilian higher school is encountering even today. It has no opportunity to plan the training of students in specific specialties, let alone guarantee the employment of their graduates. The military school is in a different situation. The existing forecasts of the numerical strength and structure of the Armed Forces make it possible to predict the need for officers in specific specialties with sufficient reliability, and to plan their training in the VUZ. This is why the Statute on Higher Military Educational Institutions views the baccalaureate only as a possible intermediate stage in the training of officers who are degreed specialists or masters degree recipients.

Analysis of the activity of higher military educational institutions has shown that in military academies, military institutions and higher military schools with a period of study of 5 years, the organization and content of education basically meets the new state requirements for higher education of the third level. The matter is more complex with respect to the command schools with periods of study of 4 years. Officially they have trained degreed specialists, but the actual level of their training often did not correspond to the issued diploma, and frequently the quality of education did not satisfy either the line units or the graduates themselves. At present a transition of all higher military educational institutions offering a higher military-special education is under way, toward a normative period of study of no less than five years.

At the same time, in order to raise the status of the higher schools, which possess the highest scientific potential and modern scientific and laboratory facilities, their conversion to military institutes is in progress. The training of science-teaching cadres for the other schools will be concentrated in the institutions, and the teaching of masters candidates will also be organized there.

Adaptation of the organization and content of education to the state educational standards first put into practice of the Russian higher school by the Law of the Russian Federation "On Education." The purpose of the state standards is to ensure a uniform educational space under the conditions of diversification of education, and to provide a foundation for objective assessment of the activity of the VUZ and the level of preparedness of graduates regardless of the type of VUZ and the form in which education is obtained.

The state educational standard with respect to general requirements on higher education was approved by the government of the Russian Federation. It establishes the structure of higher education, including the level of education and the normative periods of study. It defines the

general requirements on educational programs and conditions of their realization, as well as the general norms for the academic load of the students, and a number of other norms, uniform for all higher educational institutions of the country regardless of their type, structure, and departmental subordination. The Classifier of Directions and Specialties of Higher Professional Education, which at the instruction of the government of the Russian Federation is being approved by the Goskomvuz [State VUZ Committee] of Russia, is a component part of this state standard.

State educational standards in specific directions and specialties are approved by Goskomvuz of Russia by agreement with the ministries and departments for which the specialists are trained. These state standards establish the minimum of academic time and minimal content of training programs by basic cycles of the disciplines: general humanities, socioeconomic, natural science and general professional. They also set the requirements on the level of preparedness of the graduates: What they must have an idea about, what they must know and know how to use in their practical activity, what skills they must master and the experience they must have in the conduct of what practical actions. The state standards for basic higher education (the baccalaureate) for all directions of training were already approved by Goskomvuz in 1993. State standards in specialties are being devised at present by training-methods associations, which include the leading VUZ of the country training the corresponding specialists.

Starting in 1994/1995, the military educational institutions of the Defense Ministry, in accordance with the Law "On Compulsory Military Service" began training all cadets in civilian specialties that are close or related to their military specialty. Students studying in programs of higher military-professional education will also obtain a civilian specialty, in addition to their military one. Precisely this civilian specialty will be entered in the diploma for graduates of our VUZ. As for military educational institutions with a four-year period of study, training of cadets in civilian specialties will begin only with their transition to five-year education.

Civilian specialties that students and cadets will learn are general state ones. They are included in the Classifier of Directions and Specialists of Higher Professional Education, in whose development the organs of administration of the VUZ of the Defense Ministry took a most direct role. Now with allowance for these specialties it is time to revise the content of training in our VUZ.

The main difficulty is to combine the high demands on military-professional training of officers with the demands of the state standards. And to do this, it is necessary for the military educational institutions and administrative organs of the VUZ even now to take a most active part in the work of the academic-methods associations of the higher school in formulating the future state standards. We must strive to ensure that the requirements of the state standards in natural science, general professional and special disciplines be maximally tied to the qualification requirements of our military specialists.

The introduction of state standards is aimed at raising the quality of education and at renewing the content and

methods of education. It must be accompanied by comprehensive organization and scientific-methods support, providing for the development of a new generation of study plans, curricula and other planning documents, the writing of new textbooks and aids, and the refitting of training-laboratory and field training facilities. However, given the realities of our lives today, the question arises of whether state standards will help improve the training of specialists under conditions wherein there is a drop in the prestige of education and a reduction of interest in study. I can say one thing with confidence: reliance on standards does not allow us to lower the level of requirements on graduates, in any case lower than the level past which the VUZ may be deprived of the right to issue a state diploma. A state accreditation service created in our country will see to this.

The success of reform of military education will depend on many factors, but two of them are decisive. First of all, the effectiveness of reform will be determined by how steadfastly we begin to implement the principle of priority of education, which was repeatedly proclaimed in the Order of the President of Russia No 1 in the Law "On Education," and in other documents, and as applied to military educational institutions, in the Concept of Development of the System of Higher Education. Without fulfillment of the state guarantees of priority mentioned in the Law "On Education," much will boil down to the customary change of signs and another cosmetic repair. And the second, most important condition, without which effective reform is impossible, is active, conscientious and involved participation in it by the pedagogic community, the administrative organs of higher education, and all personnel of the military educational institutions.

Concept of Development of System of Military Education

95UM0016B Moscow *ORIENTIR* in Russian No 9, Sep 1994 pp 58-62

[Article by Yuriy Goncharov: "In the Channel of Renewal"; "Concept of Development of a System of Military Education of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By Defense Ministry Order No. 191, 1993, the Concept of Development of the System of Military Education of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was approved. It defined the strategy and the basic directions of reform of military education conducted in the Russian Army. Under the rubric of "Military Education," the editors of *ORIENTIR* are offering regular information on the course of reform, the problems of military education, and VUZ [higher educational institution] life.

To acquaint the readers more deeply with the contents of the Concept itself, we have asked a leading specialist on it from the Directorate of Military Education of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, Yuriy Goncharov, to tell us about it.

The concept proceeds from the idea that development of military education is a component part and one of the priority directions of development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The priority of development of military education in the course of reform is assured by a group of organizational, material-technical, financial and personnel measures.

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The concept was devised in complete agreement with the new legislative documents on matters of defense, the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and the development of education in Russia, with allowance for the real economic capabilities of the state, as well as for the experience and prospects for development of education in the country, and military education abroad.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have a completely developed system of military education with a sufficiently strong science-teaching potential, developed academic facilities, and rich historical training experience and traditions. For this reason, the main goal of the transformations is maximal reliance on the existing system of military education, while raising it to a qualitatively new level.

Plans are to improve military education in three stages, corresponding to the stages of development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In the first stage (1991-1992), important steps were taken toward restoring the system of education that was disrupted as a result of the end of existence of the USSR. Military-political VUZ were restructured, and a number of military schools were redeployed to the territory of Russia. Training of officers in many shortage specialists was organized, and the process of restoration of lost science schools was begun. On the basis of analysis of the real state of the system of military education, the calculations and justifications were made which were necessary for its subsequent reformation, and which provided for rational use of the existing science-teaching potential and the training facilities.

During the second stage (1993-1995), the integrity of the system of military education will be fully restored, and the conditions prepared for further profound reformation. For these purposes:

1. The planned redeployments and restructuring of military educational institutions will be concluded. Training of officers in all shortage specialists will be organized. A VUZ whose elimination does not require construction of an analogous facility in a new place will be dissolved or prepared for dissolution.

2. The work of forming a scientifically sound state order for the training of officer cadres will be launched on a broad front.

For purposes of raising the fundamental nature of military education and the professional mobility of officers, it is proposed that the number of specialties for training of officer cadres in military educational institutions be reduced. The designations of the military specialists will approximate their civilian counterparts, and in addition to their military specialty they will also receive a civilian one. All this will raise the social protection of the officers and expand their opportunities for employment upon discharge to the reserve.

At present the development of qualification requirements for VUZ graduates in all specialties is being concluded, and development of a fundamentally new generation of study plans and curricula, meeting the requirements of state educational standards, has been started on its basis. [These standards] are being introduced in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On Education."

The task is to raise the level of fundamental training of graduates while retaining the appropriate practical direction in training through specialization at the concluding stage of study.

An important place is assigned to improving training methods. This will be directed to a greater degree toward development of the creative thinking of officers, and the formation of their intellectual potential. We must move more boldly toward active, developing methods of study. We must assimilate and introduce new training technologies based on the use of computers and modern information resources.

The transition toward training in new specialties, with new study plans and curricula, is planned for no earlier than conclusion of a full training cycle in accordance with the present study plans and curricula, which were introduced in the 1991/92 academic year. Before the start of training with the new study plans and curricula, operational adjustment of current questions and the introduction of new ones in the academic process will be implemented within the limits of rights granted to the chiefs of the military educational institutions.

3. The concept provides for a number of measures directed toward improving professional orientation work, the recruitment of youth to study at military educational institutions, and their preparation for entering the VUZ. The military professional orientation of youth to officer professions is acknowledged to be one of the main tasks of professional orientation work. There are also plans to expand the network of Suvorov military schools and Nakhimov naval schools (cadet corps), including through their creation on the basis of the higher military schools being eliminated. And to promote the creation of specialized general educational schools (classes), military lyceums and other pre-VUZ educational institutions with a military leaning.

4. Training of officer cadres at VUZ in accordance with the Concept has been switched to a contract basis, which must raise the personal responsibility and interest of the students and cadets in their studies. The next step is to develop the legal norms to protect the VUZ from persons seeking to obtain an education at the expense of the Ministry of Defense, without subsequent military service.

5. In accordance with the Concept, in 1993-1994 the Ministry of Defense did a lot of work to preserve and strengthen the science-teaching potential of military educational institutions.

The network and capacity of postgraduate studies have been organized with allowance for the changed requirements and real capabilities of the VUZ. Postgraduate study has become primarily goal-oriented and functions in the leading VUZ, which possess high scientific potential and modern experimental facilities.

The network of doctoral programs, which are created only in military educational institutions with strong, respected scientific schools, as a rule at military academies and institutes, has been clarified. The doctoral programs must become exclusively goal-oriented, and the total capacity of the doctoral programs must be around 10 percent of the postgraduate programs.

In accordance with the Concept, the new Statute on Higher Military Academic Institutions of the RF Defense Ministry defined the legal status of the doctoral candidates and postgraduate students as service members of the permanent staff of the VUZ. The next task is to resolve the questions of their social protection. For doctoral and postgraduate students, their scientific directors and consultants, plans are to develop measures for material encouragement to stimulate the successful accomplishment of individual plans and defense of dissertation work within deadlines.

The network of dissertation councils for protection of doctoral and candidates dissertations is being revised. Given the cut in the Armed Forces and in the capacity of the military educational institutions, the question of preserving science schools, supporting the work of specialized councils, and raising the science-teaching potential of the VUZ is a very urgent one. The Concept indicates that for these purposes it is necessary to provide for maximal possible use of actively working scientists both by extending their period of active military service, and by using them after discharge to the reserve.

6. In order to raise the professional level of the teachers of military schools, plans are to organize their training in military-teaching groups of military academies and military institutes with a period of training of 2 to 3 years, with conferral of military-pedagogy credentials to graduates. Training of science teachers in masters studies is also possible.

7. A number of measures that were provided for by the Concept have been implemented to improve the organization and stimulate the labor of the professors and teaching staff. The norms for planning and accounting for the labor of teachers have been revised with allowance for the requirements of further individual training, the adoption of new information technologies, and computerization of the training process. The list of pedagogical positions of officers, which was not adequately differentiated and tended toward leveling, has been adapted to the general state nomenclature of pedagogical positions. To supplement the existing positions, instructor and senior instructor, the positions of docent and professor have been added.

Among the tasks requiring solution are the development and adoption of a system of periodic certification of science-teaching qualifications of the professors, instructors and scientific staff of the VUZ.

In the third stage of reform (after 1995), the formation of a qualitatively new system of military education should be completed, one adequate to the new structure and new tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. For these purposes, the Concept provides for the following measures:

1. Optimization of the network of military educational institutions, adapting the inventory and capacity of VUZ to the new structure and numerical strength of the RF Armed Forces and to the real needs of the army and navy for officer cadres. The main direction of optimization is reduction in the number of VUZ on the basis of their rational consolidation. The capacity of military schools must be no fewer than 1200 to 1500 cadets, and that of academies no fewer than 750 to 800 students. In the future we should be oriented toward further consolidation of VUZ and the

creation of academic science complexes, if the economic situation in the country makes it possible to plan major capital investments in conducting these measures.

Integration and the creation of strong training-methods and science complexes, combining the training of military cadres of various specialties and levels of education, as well as of various combat arms and services, must become the basic form of VUZ consolidation. Integration can include the merging of like or related VUZ deployed in the same city (garrison), the reorganization of small VUZ which lose their scientific potential into faculties of related military or civilian VUZ, and the combining of training of military cadres with various levels of education, including training of warrant-officer (petty officer) technicians and junior military specialists.

The freed-up pedagogic potential and academic facilities of the eliminated VUZ will be used to build up the corresponding facilities of the preserved VUZ, to organize inter-VUZ (regional) training centers supporting the practical training and field proficiency of students and cadets, and to create Suvorov and Nakhimov schools (cadet corps).

The concept pays special attention to the need to preserve military academies in the course of reorganization as training-methods and scientific centers of services and combat arms, with their priceless scientific potential and unique training facilities. For these purposes, a reasonable combination of academies of one armed service can be effected, the training of engineer-researchers can be expanded, and the training of masters of science for science-intensive and research work can be organized in the most difficult specialties, associated with prospective changes in the development of military science and military technology. It also appears expedient to develop all forms of supplementary and post-VUZ education of officers on the basis of the academies, and to allow the academies to train civilian specialists on a contract basis for defense and other branches of industry.

The Concept proposes raising the status of the best military schools, which possess highly professional science-teaching collectives and which successfully implement the training of science-teaching cadres. By decision of the government of the Russian Federation, four higher military schools have already been reorganized into military institutions: the Military Institute of Radioelectronics (Voronezh), the Military Automotive Institute (Ryazan), the Military Engineering Construction Institute (St. Petersburg), and the Military-Transport Institute of Railroad Troops and Military Communications (St. Petersburg). Their legal status has been defined by the new Statute on Higher Military Educational Institutions of the RF Ministry of Defense.

2. Adapting the levels of military education and periods of study to the Law of the Russian Federation "On Education" and the new multi-level structure of higher education in Russia. The Concept proceeds from the idea that the basis of the system of military education must be the training of degreed specialists, with awarding of a diploma of higher professional education on the state model to the graduates of military educational institutions, and conferral of credentials in accordance with the received speciality. Here the content of the training should be adapted to the state requirements on professional curricula of the third level in

the new structure of higher education in Russia, and thus ensure the training of graduates for independent creative professional activity.

The Concept provides that higher military schools, military institutes and military faculties in civilian VUZ prepare degreed specialists with higher military-special education for primary officer positions, with the prospect of advancement to higher positions. The normative period of study is five years, and for groups made up of students of civilian VUZ after completion of the third or fourth years, three years. In accordance with this, the transition of higher command and other four-year military schools and military institutes to a five-year period is one of the main and primary tasks of reform of military education. The overwhelming majority of VUZ of the Defense Ministry switched to new periods of study in the 1994/95 academic year in order to provide the opportunity to all cadets starting in November 1994 to receive a civilian specialty along with the military one.

The military academies will train degreed specialists with higher military education, intended for appointment as a rule to positions no lower than the regimental level. The period of study is from two to three years. The officers will be trained as specialists in the field of administration of large military collectives, in the organization and comprehensive support of activity of troops both in peacetime and in war, with the conferral of the corresponding credentials on the graduates. If necessary the training of officers with higher military education may also be organized in military institutes.

Officers for science-intensive and research work—degreed specialists with higher military-special education—will be trained with a period of study of 6 years by the engineering faculties of military academies, by military institutes, and by the leading higher military schools. For these same purposes, by agreement with the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Higher Education, these VUZ can organize the training of masters candidates for targeted assignment, with awarding of a higher-education (third level) diploma to the graduates and conferral of a masters degree.

As for the secondary military aviation-technical schools, they will continue to train officer-technicians with secondary military-special education. The period of training is three years. But in the future all military educational institutions training officers must become higher [schools], and higher education must become mandatory for every officer.

3. The Concept provides that simultaneously with the lengthening of the period of study at schools, and in order to raise the professional mobility of the officer cadets, the transition of higher command and engineering schools to a uniform command-engineering training structure will be carried out, naturally only in the specialties which allow rotation of officers between command and engineering positions in the line units. At the military academies, the division of training structures into command and engineering types will generally be retained.

4. Great tasks to reorganize the qualification enhancement system of officer cadres are being assigned. Here the principle of officer training in his planned field will be the basis.

The concept of training in courses must precisely match the VUZ training of cadres. The problem is to efficiently and flexibly react to the changing needs of the line units and on this basis to assure the constant high professionalism of all categories of officer personnel. Along with the existing system of courses, other forms of supplemental education of officers will be developed.

5. One of the tasks of reform is to raise the effectiveness and increase the contribution of VUZ science to safeguard national security. For these purposes, the efforts of science collectives of military educational institutions, particularly military academies, must be concentrated to a greater degree on the conduct of fundamental and basic research oriented toward the future development of the RF Armed Forces, resolution of the problems of training and utilizing the army, and the development of military art.

There must be an increase in the volume of research on the problems of military education, military pedagogy and psychology. It is proposed that a scientific research center for problems of military education, improvement of the training and teaching process, and development of new information technologies and training methods be created on the basis of one of the military academies.

The transition to new economic relations and the reduction in the appropriations budget for defense urgently demand the development and adoption of a more flexible method of administration which would allow the VUZ to more effectively use their scientific potential.

The Concept proceeds from the need to expand the rights of VUZ in the field of scientific-economic activity and the accumulation and independent use of off-budget resources received from the sale of scientific and technical products and scientific publishing activity, in the interests of development of training and scientific facilities, economic incentive, and the strengthening of social protection of personnel.

6. The Concept speaks of the need to improve the management of training of military cadres and the activity of the military educational institutions. The organs of management of military education are assigned the task of raising the efficiency and flexibility of centralized leadership. They must assure the conduct of a coordinated policy, and the realization of uniform approaches and uniform demands on the training, certification and use of officer cadres. They must eliminate formalism and trivial regulation in the work of the VUZ.

It is also necessary to continue the course toward democratization of the life of the VUZ collectives in accordance with the norms and principles of VUZ law, in order to assure on this basis the broad and interested participation of the VUZ community in the conduct of transformations. Plans are to develop a group of measures aimed at expanding the rights of the military educational institutions and at raising their administrative independence under conditions of a market economy and reduction in defense spending.

First of all the administrative organs of military education must revise and completely renew the normative and legal basis of the system of military education, and revise the basic governing documents regulating the activity of the VUZ on the basis of new legislative and normative documents on defense matters, the development of the Armed

Forces, and the development of education in Russia. Included among the first documents developed in accordance with this Concept was the new Statute on Higher Military Educational Institutions of the Defense Ministry, which was put in force by order of the Defense Minister No 110, 1994.

In order to raise the level of leadership of military education, we have acknowledged the need to create conditions for the recruitment of highly-trained officers, having science-teaching qualifications and experience in working at military educational institutions. Specifically the concept calls for organization of training in academic courses within the system of qualification enhancement for supervisor personnel of the Goskomvuz [State VUZ Committee] of Russia for workers in the VUZ apparatus.

Railroad Troops Deputy Chief Interviewed

954E0015A Moscow GUDOK in Russian 5 Oct 94
pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant General N. Koshman, deputy chief of Railroad Troops of Russia, by V. Chibisov; place and date not given: "The Fighting Men of the Steel Highways"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Railroad Troops appeared in Russia as far back as 1851, when five independent railroad troop companies were formed on one of the first railroads in Russia—the St. Petersburg-Moscow Railroad. Stages of labor and battle exploits of the soldier-railroaders make up the history of the Railroad Troops..

The Great Patriotic War is a special paragraph in this history. The protection of railroad installations and the restoration of railroads—all of this was shouldered by the soldier-railroaders. It is enough to recall that a bridge 1,039 meters long across the Dnieper was restored in 13 days through their efforts. Participation in the construction of railroad lines in the postwar period, coping with natural disasters, catastrophes...

5 October is considered the holiday of the Railroad Troops.

[Chibisov] Nikolay Pavlovich! Well then, who is he, the soldier-railroader? A builder, a repairman? How does he differ, for example, from those who serve in a construction battalion?

[Koshman] The range of tasks that our troops perform is rather broad. The main ones are the technical protection of large railroad installations, the sheltering and restoration of railroads, and the construction of new railroad lines. We have highly qualified specialists for this and the necessary modern equipment. There are a lot of examples of this, and it is enough to recall the earthquake in Armenia, Chernobyl, the explosions that occurred at the Arzamas and Sverdlovsk stations, the passenger train catastrophe in Bologoye, etc. We always come to help there where it is needed. Also well-known is our participation in carrying out national economic tasks—the construction of the Abakan-Tayshet, Tyumen-Surgut, the Izdel-Ob, BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], and other lines.

In contrast to the military builders who engage only in the erection of facilities, our functions are somewhat broader.

For example, in resolving the question of technical protection, we also build and put up crossings, and we guard and defend them. While we build railroad defenses, in a retreat of combat units, we destroy stations and major junctions, and we restore them when they are liberated. The Railroad Troops have unit combat banners and regular-issue weapons that the military builders do not have.

[Chibisov] An edict of the president of the Russian Federation concerning the status of the Railroad Troops also defines their place in the system of administration—"attached to the MPS [Ministry of Railways] of Russia." Can this be interpreted as subordination to the Ministry of Railways?

[Koshman] No. We are a separate branch of troops. In accordance with the edict of the president of the Russian Federation, we are attached to the MPS. This again is the result of the tasks that confront us. There is a front and a rear area in a period of military operations. In resolving tasks of technical protection of the rear area, we must ensure the passage of trains through important railroad stations and water obstacles (if something is destroyed, we restore it). We operate here in the interests of the MPS and of the railroad on which we find ourselves. But, on a frontal sector, we ensure the work of transport in directions of interest to the front. That is why we have this kind of a status.

[Chibisov] Nikolay Pavlovich! A reduction in the Armed Forces is going on now. The process is complicated; moreover, it is painful. For many, especially for officers, this is a loss of work and a state of social unsettlement...

[Koshman] The reduction affected us as well. But just with the adopted measures, we succeeded in supporting the troops at the necessary level. After all, a large number of facilities entrusted to the former Ministry of Transport Construction require technical protection, together with MPS facilities. But it became a joint-stock company. Many construction-assembly trains and even trusts there collapsed, to put it mildly. The facilities ended up being stripped. In order to take them under our "protection," it was necessary for us to increase the number of troops. And now this question is being worked on. Evidently, it will be submitted for examination by the Government of the Russian Federation.

[Chibisov] In connection with the fact that your activity is associated with the railroad, apparently a process exists in the Railroad Troops for selecting draftees who already acquired a transportation specialty in civilian life?

[Koshman] The question is interesting and complicated, and, I think, it has state importance. We continuously request and require that graduates of railroad schools and technical secondary schools go through compulsory service in the Railroad Troops. During service, a young specialist accumulates experience and increases his qualifications. An engineer's assistant receives the right to run a locomotive (they are the general Russian models in our country). He returns to civilian life already a master of his profession. It is also advantageous for the MPS to acquire such a locomotive operator, railwayman, bridge builder, etc., in its ranks. But for the time being, all we can do is to hope for such a draft procedure.

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We get young people who have already succeeded in working somewhere, or from a school and student bench. We train them ourselves. We have a good training base for this, there are training subunits where we prepare the necessary specialists. Along with special training, they also receive full combat training.

Quite a few come to us for service on a contract basis. We take them gladly—these are already established specialists. The equipment works more reliably in their hands, and they serve longer.

[Chibisov] Where and at what transport facilities is it possible today to meet soldier-railroaders?

[Koshman] We are now conducting an electrification of two sectors: the Zilovo-Ksenevka on the Transbaykal Railroad and the Khabarovsk-Bikin on the Far Eastern Railroad. This is the only remaining sector that is not electrified on the Transsiberian Railroad. Previously, subunits of the Glavbamtroy [main directorate of Baykal-Amur mainline construction] worked here, but they did not complete it. Last year we extended the contact system on a 52-kilometer sector, and this year another 80 kilometers were given to us. The conditions are very difficult. The development of foundation pits in rock can be conducted only with the blasthole-drilling method. But the military railroad formations that are commanded by Colonel V. Timoshenko are persistently moving ahead to the ultimate objective—the completion of the electrification of the Transsib. This will be yet another important milestone in the history of our troops.

We are continuing work on the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], and we are building the new lines Abakan-Mezhdurechensk in the Kuzbass [Kuznetsk coal basin], and the Ledmozero-Kochkoma line in Karelia, and at a number of other sites. In particular, we have undertaken the repair of trolley lines in Moscow at the request of the mayor of the capital. We have deployed our units here, revised the technology of the work, prepared the necessary mechanisms... And here is the result: In 1992, 9.2 kilometers were repaired, last year—36.5 kilometers, and today we are reaching the 50-kilometer mark.

It must be said that the business managers are eagerly giving us work. We are trying to do everything in a high-quality way and on time. The soldier-railroaders are sticking to their word.

We are also conducting important work on our own installations. This year, just in housing alone, we should start construction on 104,000 square meters. We are building barracks, depots, warehouses...

[Chibisov] Nikolay Pavlovich, please accept the warmest congratulations on the holiday from the journalists and readers of GUDOK, among whom there are a lot of those who went through and are going through service in the Railroad Troops.

[Koshman] Thank you. In turn, I extend the holiday greetings of the Railroad Troops to our veterans, the participants

in the Great Patriotic War, and to all of those who are now going through difficult service among the Karelian lakes, in the Siberian taiga, and in the mud volcanoes of the Trans-Amur region, while performing their military duty. And I sincerely greet our coworkers, those who remained in the Ukraine, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Baltics, and other countries of the near abroad. We are bound together by friendship. This is our common holiday.

Afghan Veterans' Union Chairman Writes Organization's History

954F0103A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 94 p 7

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga: "Aleksandr Kotenev's Unfinished War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Neokonchennaya voyna" [Unfinished War]—that is the title of Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Kotenev's recently published book. Kotenev is chairman of the Afghanistan Veterans' Union. It's easy to figure out that the book is about the causes, conditions and history of the creation of one of Russia's most massive organizations.

I have known Aleksandr Kotenev for a long time—we both served in the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, units of which were deployed in northern Afghanistan. Already in 1980, long before Gorbachev's perestroika, he was one of a few officers who claimed: we have nothing to do in Afghanistan.

Having been wounded—his BTR [armored transport vehicle] was blown up by a mine—Aleksandr returned to the Homeland and entered a military academy where he continued to discredit the myth of the "international duty". In 1983, he claimed in his candidate's dissertation that in Afghanistan our army was not fighting against the opposition but against an entire people. And soon, he dedicated himself to the founding of a social organization which would resolve the problems of social and psychological adaptation of hundreds of thousands of people who were shattered by the war.

"I saw: many of those who returned home found themselves on the side of the road with their problems, the State that sent them to war immediately attempted to forget about them, just as if there had not been nearly 15,000 killed, 417 missing in action, 469,685 wounded, seriously hurt and traumatized people, of which 10,751 people became disabled of various categories," said Aleksandr Kotenev. "And then, in order to survive, we decided to organize ourselves and to take care of ourselves."

It would seem that the war ended for us a long time ago, it has passed into history, the wounds are healing, however, the Afghanistan Veterans Union is expanding its social base. Those people who have managed to fight on the expanses of their Homeland are being attracted to it. "The lessons of the civil war in Afghanistan itself have graphically demonstrated: We must not permit Russia to be transformed into one large 'hot spot'".

And in that sense, the war has not ended for him.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russia, Moldova Agree on Text for Withdrawal of 14th Army*95UM0047A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 94 p 3*

[Article by Sergey Knyazkov: "Three Years' Training: Russia and Moldova Reach Final Consensus on Text of Agreement on Withdrawal of 14th Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Late last week Russian-Moldovan talks in which mutual understanding was reached in all discussed issues were conducted in Kishinev. The text of an intergovernmental agreement on legal status and on the procedure and timetable for withdrawal of Russian forces temporarily stationed in Moldova has been agreed upon conclusively. According to Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, first deputy commander-in-chief of Russian ground forces, who participated in the talks, the deadline has been set at 3 years. The agreement becomes effective only after it is signed at the government level.

Leaders of the Dnestr region, where the Russian forces are located, have been opposed to withdrawal of the 14th Army, and made frequent refusals to participate in such talks, warning moreover that if the army were to leave, they would treat its armament and property as their own. It seems as if this position has now softened, as is evidenced by the results of a meeting in Tiraspol between Vladimir Kitayev, the head of the RF delegation in the talks with Moldova, and Grigoriy Marakutsiya, chairman of the parliament of the Dnestr Moldovan Republic. In a joint communique they expressed the shared opinion that practical steps toward withdrawal of Russian forces will be synchronized with political settlement of the Dnestr conflict and the granting of special status to the Dnestr region. This meeting was probably what predetermined the success of another round in the Russian-Moldovan talks, because during them, according to Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, the parties came to a similar opinion.

By the way, the distance from assertion of the fact to its implementation is extremely great. The meeting of working groups of experts of Moldova and the Dnestr Moldovan Republic, planned last Friday for the purpose of developing a special political status for the Dnestr region, had to be postponed at the request of Tiraspol. According to information from the Dnestr administration, Tiraspol experts needed a few more days to familiarize themselves with the draft submitted by Kishinev, and develop their own proposals.

The forthcoming meeting will be the second in number under the mediation of Vladlen Vasev, a special emissary of the Russian president, and Richard Semyuell, chief of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Moldova.

"The variants of a special status proposed by experts from Kishinev and Tiraspol at the first meeting are far from a compromise," declared Vladlen Vasev to an ITAR-TASS correspondent. "My hope is that wishes stated to the intermediaries will now be accounted for, and the parties will move toward one another more quickly."

Vasev does not agree with assertions by some politicians that the anticipated signing of the agreement on withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from Moldova will complicate attainment of consensus in talks on settling the Dnestr conflict.

UKRAINE

Shmarov Views Defense Issues*95UM0031A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian 12 Oct 94 pp 4-5*

[Interview with Ukrainian Vice Premier, Minister of Defense Valeriy Nikolayevich Shmarov by NEZAVISIMOST Commentator Gennadiy Korzh: "Ukrainian Vice Premier, Minister of Defense Valeriy Shmarov: '... We Don't Need To Engage in Saber Rattling but To Be Involved With Preventive Measures for Peace'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time in the history of Ukraine, not a general but a civilian has been confirmed in the post of minister of defense. In parliament, the candidacy of Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov passed the first time, although the process of its discussion in the commissions was not very simple.

This man makes an unambiguous impression, however, it is obvious that he intends to rationally and decisively approach the reconstruction of the Armed Forces. But then again, judge for yourself: the new Ukrainian minister of defense granted an exclusive interview on a very broad circle of defense problems to a NEZAVISIMOST correspondent.

[Korzh] Valeriy Nikolayevich! The word "collapse" is being increasingly utilized while speaking about the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The military-patriotic education system for young people and the military education system have been destroyed. But on the other hand we have very many generals. And at the same time officers I know state that for a long time now no one serves the Homeland in the Ukrainian Army and, if they do something, that is only based upon the principle of personal advantage. But how do you assess the combat readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?

[Shmarov] I am not a proponent of drastic assessments. Of late, I especially cannot tolerate the expressions "impoverishment" and "collapse". You know that there is somewhat more populism in them than a real understanding of what is occurring. There is no collapse of the Armed Forces and our common mission is to prevent that. We need to do everything to stabilize the situation.

If we are speaking about the troops, then their combat readiness is still satisfactory. The social situation of servicemen, their personal disorders, unsatisfactory support of the Army, and the difficulties that all of the people are experiencing are certainly playing their negative role. And yet, in my view, the majority of officers are maintaining their devotion to the Homeland and fighting spirit. But personal advantage... But people always work to earn money, to acquire something, to feed their families, and to raise their children. When all is said and done, the life of society has been built on that... A certain lapse exists in educational work and therefore it is necessary to create a

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state patriotic work program which would mold the citizen, beginning from the childhood years.

[Korzh] Some of the mass media assert that the designation of a civilian minister of defense will result in the destruction of the command and control system. And the troops are saying that quite a bit of thoughtless and bothersome revamping will once again occur in the central staff, that the changes will not reach the troops themselves and, in the process the experience that has been accumulated during the years of the existence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be erased. What do you think on this score?

[Shmarov] Our Armed Forces has had its phases in its short history. They can entirely correspond to the personalities of the ministers of the defense department. It was difficult to form the Armed Forces of a new state from three independent military districts that were subordinate to Moscow. This required their unification into a single whole and the creation of a unified command and control center. That time causes respect—for the people who worked in the military department at that time. They carried their cross on that section of the path in a dignified manner. Today the Armed Forces structural development process is continuing and we will not report to the people that this work has been completed any time soon. All the more so that the economic difficulties that afflict our state are not facilitating it.

We should not be afraid: no one intends to destroy the existing command and control system. But you will agree that it requires continuous improvement. Now when the economy is especially clearly reflected on the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, their coordination with the national economy and I would say integration in it and a search for optimal economic and financial solutions are very important. And the Ministry of Defense's military-political activity? Today it is first of all necessary to not engage in saber rattling but to be involved with preventive measures for peace in the surrounding space. And this is also more closely related to, not military, but to civilian personnel. It's possible that the involvement of diplomats will even be required for this work. That is, the time is coming for those tasks that will be more appropriate for people from the national economy who better understand the capabilities of the state's economy to satisfy the army's requirements—we still need to find the required balance here. But there are military personnel for the resolution of specific military missions.

[Korzh] You are inheriting a quite dilapidated department. But it can also serve—in the presence, so to speak, of a good manager. I have in mind the chief of the General Staff. What functions will you assign to the General staff and its chief?

[Shmarov] The minister of defense is responsible to the parliament, the government and the president for the condition of the security and defense of the state as a whole. Naturally there cannot be two ministers—one "for management" and the other "for war". But the functions of the minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff must be somewhat differentiated. The world has recently emerged from the Cold War to a situation of arrangements. This is important military-political activity with which the minister must be involved. Add to that the economy and finances. If you ask an officer what he does not have enough of today, he will respond—money and material resources. This affects

both his personal affairs and his official duties. Coordination with national economic structures, elaboration of state tasks, orders to industry, agriculture, and science—the minister must also be in charge of that. And also the activities along the axes: the military-industrial complex—the Armed Forces, science—production, development of a national arms program; and, the elaboration of primary tasks here. It remains to add the issues of monitoring, including the General Staff's activities. Well, you yourself understand that there also remains a large sector for the chief of the General Staff.

[Korzh] I am personally troubled that you will combine the posts of minister of defense and vice premier. Throughout the world the post of minister of defense is very high in and of itself. But will you have enough strength for such a combination? On the other hand, we need to strengthen the ties between the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of Defense. Indeed, in Russia the minister of defense as before is a military man but his first deputy is a civilian, a person originally from the military-industrial complex.

[Shmarov] I think that this combination is required in the first phase. This provides additional administrative capabilities which I strongly feel right now. In principle, I don't think that it always has to be this way but this is simply necessary in the reconstruction period. Of course, it is difficult from the point of view of work loads. But it is difficult for everyone right now. You cite the Russian experience. Well, they found that composition there. Although recently they are saying in the corridors of Moscow: but won't a Russian woman head the military department.

[Korzh] What do you see as Ukraine's military strategic priorities: with Western or with Eastern allies?

[Shmarov] Ukraine is a bloc-less state. Therefore, we do not plan to join either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or a military bloc created in the CIS space because this will contradict our law. But there must be cooperation with both the West, the East, the South and the North. We must ensure our security through the intellectual technique and not through arms and we must reach an agreement on that with all of our neighbors. If you are interested in Russia, there are very large ties on military technical support both with it and with the other CIS countries. Cooperation here is so broad that we cannot reject such ties, otherwise our arms will simply be transformed into a heap of metal after a period of time.

On the other hand, we are making progress in cooperation in the West. This does not signify that we must become members of NATO but we are participating in various programs, for example, in the "Partnership for Peace". Let's assume that this not only promotes the maintenance of peace but also gives us the opportunity to study our surroundings and, in the future, possibly to create certain forms of collective security when states will be able to unite their efforts for restoring order where that is required, regardless of their membership in national political structures or military blocs.

We are working in that direction. An exchange of experts and a direction toward study are occurring, and Ukrainian subunits have already participated in joint exercises. In

general, today the foundations are being laid for future work. Those who come after us will be able to advance even farther. Of course, everything will depend on the state's military doctrine.

[Korzh] What is the situation with nuclear weapons? In accordance with the trilateral statement, we will have to eliminate all nuclear weapons. But only some of the missiles are subject to reduction in accordance with the START I Treaty. Since the trilateral agreements are not being implemented, will we not keep the solid-fueled SS-24's as a deterrent weapon and assume operational control? All the more so that we did not receive a security guarantee.

[Shmarov] It is impossible to assert that the trilateral agreements are not being implemented. It would be more accurate to say that they are being fulfilled but, unfortunately, not completely. We are conscientiously fulfilling our obligations and we are conducting ourselves very correctly and with restraint on this issue. I would say that Russia is quite precisely fulfilling its obligations. Our foreign partners are conducting themselves somewhat incorrectly. The Americans are dragging out the rates at which assistance is being rendered for our disarmament (read: their own security). The disarmament process that has occurred certainly pacifies them. Right now we are still attempting to obtain political guarantees of security from the countries who possess strategic weapons. During the course of the visits by heads of states that have begun, we are attempting to get the Americans to step up the development of the Nunn-Lugar Fund. It is this source that must feed our nuclear disarmament program. Actually, a significant volume of the work is being financed from our already negative budget.

The president has submitted a proposal to parliament on Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I will not begin to speculate on the results of their consideration. I will only point out that even if we keep a portion of the missiles (this actually corresponds to the provisions of the START I Treaty), that would in any case be without nuclear warheads. Indeed, we could install other weapons on these delivery systems...

[Korzh] For example, precision-guided.

[Shmarov] Not only. And yet we need to make the time after which Ukraine could develop and produce new weapons commensurate with the operational life of the missile delivery systems. It's quite possible that these are not just idle thoughts—we are conducting that analysis. Unfortunately, the state of our national economy, and of our military-industrial complex in particular, is such that we do not have closed cycles in many directions. We are especially concerned about materials technology: the absence of the production in adequate quantities of aluminum, magnesium, titanium, other non-ferrous metals, carbon-plastic and chemical products, including explosives. In general, we need to study everything well, all the more so that the state's policy could change.

[Korzh] Will Ukraine be a missile-space power as your predecessor asserted?

[Shmarov] As a man who worked in the missile-space industry for 29 years, I have the right to state—with total awareness of what is occurring there. A national space program exists that is designed until the year 2000. The task

there, where it is necessary, is to develop our own independent local production cycles as rapidly as possible (Ukraine is not a large enough country to do everything), to establish cooperation where it is necessary, and to preserve those capacities that we objectively had in the missile-space technology sphere.

I must say that some progress is being made. I think that we will attempt to launch our first monitoring satellite (for remote probing of Earth) in approximately 1996 and, two years later—our first geostationary communications satellite.

Today this industry is also operating but it is fulfilling Russia's orders—for the development of special satellites, launch vehicles, and corresponding components and systems. Of course, the sector is operating at approximately 10% of its capacity.

[Korzh] How do you see the future of the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy?

[Shmarov] Ukraine must have its own navy, our citizens make up a significant portion of the seamen. That is why we are developing our own Navy. Of course, right now they are in the stage of being created. There still are neither appropriate facilities, the Navy itself, nor the infrastructure, and the training system has been disrupted. We have to create everything from zero. But the patriots who serve in the Ukrainian Navy are doing this with great enthusiasm. I in no way intend to paint an idyllic picture. I understand that Ukrainian naval officers are possibly experiencing greater difficulties than officers in the other services.

And the Black Sea Fleet will most likely be divided. Both sides understand that. However, I don't think that this will happen tomorrow. We have come to the hardest part: the division of the land-based infrastructure and basing. I think that these problems will be resolved and the Ukrainian Navy will be allotted a large number of ships and the corresponding infrastructure. Incidentally, some orders have also been placed at ship building plants, although a lack of money doesn't allow us to conduct this work as we should. However, I think that we will have a good, compact navy that can handle its missions by the year 2000. We don't intend to go out into the World Ocean, we need to ensure the security of our own shores and to repel a possible attack in the Black Sea water area. We are working on creating this Navy.

[Korzh] Then we don't have any interests in the Mediterranean Sea and all the more so in the Atlantic Ocean?

[Shmarov] We are not an aggressive power.

[Korzh] But do we fish?

[Shmarov] We fish but we don't see them. The fishermen sell the fish to other states. If you have in mind protecting them from piracy, then let's analyze the state of our fishing industry. It is on the verge of changing forms of ownership. And we are ready to review a fishing vessel escort program if a customer (the stock company or collective enterprise) will finance it. They will have to allocate capital, essentially private, and money for its protection from their budget.

[Korzh] But don't these private entrepreneurs conscientiously pay taxes?

[Shmarov] That's true. Only what will the remaining 52 million taxpayers say? At any rate, we need to think this through. Calculate how much they pay in taxes and what escorting will cost. What is more, this question is often posed: who will escort the tankers. But for the time being, we have neither the tankers nor the terminal itself. As these missions emerge—we will adjust the tenets for the creation of the Navy.

[Korzh] It is known that the Russian Federation's Black Sea Fleet, as they already officially call it, is conducting exercises, including with live firing. What rules regulate its entry into and exit from Ukrainian territorial waters?

[Shmarov] I want to remind you that the Black Sea Fleet is dual subordinated and has dual command and control. Although you can actually put the word "dual" in quotation marks... And it enters into Ukraine's territorial waters and exits from them while complying with all of the required border procedures. There were certain incidents but they were more likely an exception to the rule.

[Korzh] Will Russian bases be located on Ukrainian territory and for how long?

[Shmarov] Your question obviously concerns the 43rd Missile Army and the Black Sea Fleet. The missileers, although they are in Russia's combat command and control system, have already taken an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. Although one can pose the question just like you do with regard to the 43rd Army. However, the largest problems in this context are associated with the Black Sea Fleet. The time of the Russian seamen's stay on Ukrainian soil will depend on the period for which the lease contract will be signed. I stress: This will be precisely a lease, with all of the requirements that proceed from that for maintenance of the social infrastructure, ecology, etc. These requirements have already largely been formulated. And I will tell about what we have managed to agree to when we have agreed to it.

[Korzh] What is your choice: wholesale conversion or rational arms sales? What is the state of affairs in the military-industrial complex? Specifically, at "Yuzhmash", the Plant imeni Malyshev, and Black Sea Ship Building Plant? Will the AN-72 enter the inventory?

[Shmarov] Military equipment and arms must be produced in a normal state. Incidentally no one has conducted wholesale conversion in our country, and we have attempted to preserve the capacity that we need in this economically difficult time. In other words, we have fed this capacity with orders as much as we have been able to, and at the same time we have fostered cooperation with other Ukrainian enterprises under them—the economic ties with Russia were cut off for well-known reasons. For the time being, there is no question of arms sales: first of all, we need to supply ourselves. It has developed in such a way that few final types of military products were produced in Ukraine and those were tied in very complex cooperation with Russia. For example, strategic missiles. But today this is hardly a primary type of weapon for us. The main thing is that there was no production of barrels, artillery pieces, machineguns, grenade launchers or other types.

Conversion is certainly necessary. Right now are we really capable of increasing the workload at such enormous enterprises as, say, the Plant imeni Malyshev, which could produce several thousand tanks per year? This is an absurd task for Ukraine. And this is only the head enterprise: there were also others behind it where turrets, tank tracks, wheels, diesel engines, etc., were manufactured. We need to reduce this production to a rational level and develop its national loop cycle. We are trying to do that right now and not only at the Plant imeni Malyshev. The expression reconversion has even appeared among industrialists. It is controversial, however, they are utilizing precisely it while having in mind the development of technological sectors in arms production that were previously absent in our country.

We are significantly converting the Plant Imeni Malyshev because just it and "Yuzhmash" are capable of consuming Ukraine's budget. That is why we are leaving the necessary minimum and we are developing new production. But this is difficult—it is a too highly specialized enterprise. But today "Yuzhmash"—this is tractors, trolley buses, wind-powered equipment, and household appliances. The national space program is also being carried out there. Black Sea Ship Building has done quite well entering the market and has received orders for a series of tankers for Greece. They also manufacture trawlers there. In short, it is loaded down with work. Although, of course, not as much as in those years when an order for the development of a new series of major surface combatants could compose an entire five-year program. But then again, we are also maintaining the capabilities for military production at ChSZ [Black Sea Ship Building Plant].

We will gladly accept the AN-72 into the inventory, it is an outstanding aircraft. But for the time being the AN-72 is undergoing static and dynamic tests on the ground—as they say, we are still driving it in the yard. We very much want for it to take off very soon because this aircraft symbolizes the strength of Ukrainian engineering intellect and the capabilities of our industry. Although much for the AN-70 arrived through cooperation and this is explainable. No single country is capable of building an aircraft on its own—even those countries like the USSR and the United States. For the time being, it is hard to say when it will enter the inventory but its primary function will certainly be—as a military transport aircraft. It will fly and we will put it into the inventory. For now we are feeding its finishing touches from the state budget, including under a defense task. However, the AN-70 is entirely suitable for the national economy.

[Korzh] Please characterize the state of affairs with scrapping munitions.

[Shmarov] Things are bad because very large quantities of munitions turned out to be concentrated in Ukraine. I don't want to frighten people with the numbers but a definite danger exists. Many munitions were hurriedly hauled away from the Groups of Soviet Forces that were located in Eastern Europe. The storage facilities were not prepared beforehand and storage conditions have not been fulfilled in some places. Right now we are doing everything to exclude the possibility of thefts (and that danger also exists): security has been tightened and technical defense systems have been activated to the maximum extent possible. At the same

time, we are doing everything in order to deliver scrapping technologies as fast as possible. And not through detonation or incineration but by obtaining a useful product when the metal has been separated and the gun powder has been transformed into industrial explosives or has been separated into other elements. In the next few years, we are faced with the task of reducing the reserve by approximately 25% and by raising storage standards to exclude a dangerous situation.

[Korzh] What new arms will enter the troops in the near future?

[Shmarov] I think that in the very near future we must diligently utilize what we have to the maximum extent possible and conduct modernization where that is possible: say, equip tanks with new electronics and increase the operating range of radars. For now, we are incapable of creating the entire gamut of new weapons, although that does not mean that we are not engaged in that work. I think that the first domestically-produced models will appear in approximately 10 years.

[Korzh] The conscripts of two periods were released into the reserve at once. Who will replace them? The chief of the General Staff, while speaking on television, stated that 10% of all conscript resources are being drafted in our country and that the remaining conscript resources find any way to evade service. But it is the General Staff that must control the military commissariats and propose changes to the legislative base if that is necessary.

[Shmarov] Actually, the laws permit many young men to not be drafted. Look, who gave benefits: to individuals involved in business, to all VUZ's [higher educational institutions] without exception, to middle educational institutions, and to the Chernobyl zones. The legislator determined that. As a result, 10% of all conscript resources are actually left.

[Korzh] And who has to take the legislative initiative?

[Shmarov] We have to and we are making use of it. But right now the legislator is already clutching his head and is asking: it turns out that only the peasant is left to go into the Army. We have certain proposals on how to preserve the capacity for work of the Armed Forces. Having released the servicemen of two periods at once, we are shifting to a very complex mode for maintaining our defense capability. We are reducing staffs to a minimum in many places, while preserving them completely only in locations where combat alert duty is occurring.

[Korzh] When will dedovshchina [hazing of conscripts] be terminated? At one time, political organs were somehow involved with this problem. Initially they created the socio-psychological service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces—it totally dedicated itself to politics. Later the Main Directorate for Educational Work emerged but it's as if it is attempting to make itself out to be the political organs. Meanwhile, an enormous number of officers serve in the Army and Navy and it is they who must combat relations not in accordance with regulations.

[Shmarov] You could have posed the question on dedovshchina to the USSR ministers of defense, beginning with Zhukov, and to all of the Ukrainian ministers of defense. This problem is not new and it is senseless to name specific

time periods for its eradication. I have already said that a state military-patriotic program and educational work among both civilian and army youth are required. You can't take dedovshchina with any sort of campaigns since it, unfortunately, is too deeply rooted. Actually, reforms and improvement of the activities of the Main Directorate for Educational Work are being proposed. I consider dedovshchina to be a priority problem and we need to become involved with it immediately.

[Korzh] There are many violations of the law and crimes among servicemen. Drunkenness is flourishing. Largely due to that, the people are indifferent to the fate of the Armed Forces: if matters continue in this manner—they will lose any respect whatsoever. Maybe we can utilize the American experience? There the Army was also seriously ill after the Vietnam War. The officer corps was purged quite a bit and officers who wanted to serve remained. The Armed Forces were shifted to a professional manning method. Now there they don't drink and they are involved with sports: you don't see fat officers and generals.

[Shmarov] The Army is not some kind of isolated medium, it is interrelated with the remaining portion of society. The processes that are occurring in the country inevitably penetrate even there. And if the level of crime has risen in Ukraine, how do you protect the Army from that? It's the same thing with drunkenness although I wouldn't say that it is flourishing in the Army. Some drink and others don't. At the same time, of course, order has been diminished.

We are certainly proposing the reconstruction of the Army. You will not be able to do that immediately because it's not easy to free it from something—we first need to resolve many social problems and we need money to do that. We see the problem, we know the way to realize it, but there will hardly be a result in the next few years. We will modernize the Army and reduce its strength. For now, the Armed Forces strength level will be 450,000 men but I think that there will be further reductions.

I see definite prospects in a professional manning method. Right now we have 35,000 servicemen on contract. But we need to pay proper salaries for this innovation to progress. Then professionals could occupy the fundamental jobs in the Armed Forces. And yet all manning must remain mixed. A young man must serve in the Army: both with an educational goal, from the physical point of view, and for training reserves in the event of combat operations.

We still don't have a lot of stout generals but we have some. I advocate a requirement for participation in exercise and sports among high-ranking officers.

[Korzh] But will you run in the mornings and set the example?

[Shmarov] I will not run in the mornings because I go to bed very late. But I will participate in exercise three times a week as proposed by the order.

[Korzh] How will the housing problem be resolved? One of your predecessors even promised cottages. But in the mean time, the housing list in Kiev alone has increased significantly. There is a lack of glasnost here and therefore there is freedom for machinations.

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[Shmarov] Today housing is our most important problem. The lack of a solution for the housing problem in general constrains the possibilities for structural changes in the Army and the possibilities for Armed Forces reductions to numbers of reasonable sufficiency. Right now 72,000 servicemen need housing. And this number is snow balling: people are marrying and families are growing. Previously, we built up to 20,000 apartments per year and, for some reason, the local organs of power allocated them in accordance with the law. Now in some areas this law is very often not being carried out and the volumes of our own construction have been reduced somewhat due to the reduction of the amount of financing. However, military builders have managed to preserve their capacity. We will strive for financial opportunities (and I will seek even target financing) for us at the previous level of housing construction. I think that we will be able to improve the lives of the people in several years and we will be able to reduce the housing list to reasonable levels and become involved with the reconstruction of the Armed Forces. Incidentally, we also plan to build cottages—at the location of the missile divisions, according to Western technologies, using resources from the Nunn-Lugar Fund. And in principle, some military personnel have already built cottages for themselves...

I categorically do not agree with the fact that glasnost is absent in the allocation of housing: this is occurring with the participation of the officers housing commission and it primarily consists of people who are on the housing lists.

[Korzh] What is occurring with military garrisons? In what condition are they, who lives there, and haven't those that are in caretaker status been looted?

[Shmarov] Many military garrisons have been transferred to the national economy and many are being transferred. Right now we are reviewing the issue of transferring another 40 such facilities. On the whole, we have a trend toward ridding ourselves of excess: their maintenance is very expensive. But this is a difficult process because not everything finds employment in the national economy. How, say, do you utilize the infrastructure of a launch silo that is located in the steppe or in the forest?

[Korzh] Do we need that number of test ranges?

[Shmarov] It's possible that we actually don't need that number. Right now we are developing a test range structure optimization plan. Land is very expensive and 5,300 hectares of test range area creates a colossal burden on the budget.

[Korzh] Do you have a program for bringing aviation out of its very deep crisis? Young pilots, as a rule, are not flying. Entire units have been destroyed: not a single leader from the Ministry of Defense came to the farewell ceremony for the colors of the only guards PVO [Air Defense] aviation regiment at Vasilkov. Nearly all of its officers were released into the reserve.

[Shmarov] Today the state of aviation is very serious. What is modern war or maintenance of a defense capability today? That is the state of resources: their availability and the possibility of mobilization. So, the primary issue is not even the number of tanks or aircraft but the availability of bread, fuel and munitions.

Aviation's primary misfortune consists of the fact that the aircraft are primarily of Russian manufacture and we need to continuously purchase components and assemblies and replace spare parts. But we need rubles to do that and we don't have any. The second problem—is aviation fuel. We also have been compelled to purchase it abroad but in very limited amounts. Hence the quite small number of flying hours. We are attempting to resolve both of these problems by improving relations with Russia. Excess aircraft are being reduced. Equipment will be subject to sale and we will direct the resources earned toward the maintenance of active units. Transport aviation can earn shortage funds. Today the uncoordinated operation of aircraft is being conduction for national economic purposes. And yet this is inadequately effective because it is based on random contracts. We want to create a state company (possibly with mixed capital but controlled by the state) which would operate officially and be accessible for control. There are enough aircraft in military transport aviation to create such a company.

[Korzh] Since we are talking about aviation, will you not explain the situation with the two MiG's where we are accused of attempting to sell them to Azerbaijan?

[Shmarov] The Procurator General, who did not find a corpus delicti in this deal, explained the situation. But I will describe how everything did in fact occur for the NEZAVISIMOST readers who possibly are not familiar with the procurator's finding. Already in 1991, two MiG-25's from Azerbaijan were sent to Zaporozhye for repair. Incidentally, these aircraft consume an enormous amount of fuel and that is why they aren't especially popular. In turn, eight of our radars and 14 aircraft engines were in Azerbaijan for repairs. In accordance with the Agreement signed by the heads of the CIS member-states, the Azeri side proposed exchanging the repaired equipment, having paid for the work. Zhiguli automobiles also arose here. The aircraft repairs were partially paid for with money and partially with these automobiles, right now they are serving in the Armed Forces. That was actually what happened. And I simply get a migraine from the populists' prattle that two MiG's were sold for 24 Zhigulis. I think that the deal was rational and profitable. If we have the possibility to work like that in the future, I will gladly resort to a similar contract.

[Korzh] What kind of officer do you see in the year 2000? What will his social position in society be?

[Shmarov] I would like for his social position in society to be something like it was in 1990.

[Korzh] Thanks for the interview.

Russia's View of Problems Facing Shmarov

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8 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by LESNAYA GAZETA Correspondent V. Kuznechikov: "Hot Line: The Acting Minister of Defense Is a Reserve Lieutenant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dmitriy Tabachnik, the President of Ukraine's head of administration, introduced Valeriy Shmarov, acting head of the Ministry of Defense and former Ukrainian government vice premier for military industrial complex issues, to ranking personnel of that department.

Carrying out Leonid Kuchma's mission, Dmitriy Vladimirovich read Kuchma's edict while noting in the process that the change of leaders of one of the most important power ministries was carried out for the sake of the matter and characterizes a new stage of Ukrainian Armed Forces structural development.

So, the replacement of a military minister of defense by a civilian minister of defense has occurred. Time will tell how this will be reflected in the state of the Armed Forces and if Valeriy Nikolayevich, who holds the rank of reserve lieutenant, will manage to turn the situation for the better. A load of difficult to resolve tasks has been placed on the acting minister of defense's shoulders. It is no secret that right now a large exodus of officers is occurring from the army, especially junior officers. KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI states that the line for the military medical board that determines fitness for military service and makes the appropriate decisions is being bought for dollars. There are increasingly fewer men who desire to serve in the army. Today officers find it difficult to live: skimpy rations and miserly salaries.

An army that has powerful equipment in its inventory has literally been compelled to allocate fuel in grams so that vehicles that supply food and POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] can travel. Everything else is rusting and is becoming unserviceable. There are no field exercises and discipline is correspondingly low...

Russian Commentary on Ukraine's Perceptions of Russian Threat

95UM0020C Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by TRUD Correspondent Igor Ostrovskiy, under the rubric: "Point of View": "What Will the President and Ukraine Choose?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The West's policy must be focused on assisting those democratic forces that firmly follow the course of an anti-imperialist policy. The leaders of the former Soviet republics must be made to understand that the West's assistance and investment are directed not only at economic reforms but also at the rejection of a new union of states with unified armed forces. Ukraine occupies a central place in that policy. Despite the growth of extreme leftist forces, the advantage is still being preserved on the side of those who oppose the restoration of a unified state. However, if this country of 52 million people doesn't manage to overcome the growing nostalgia for the USSR through economic assistance and diplomatic pressure, it will be very hard to drive off the thought of the renewal of the USSR".

This is a quote from an article in the influential American Newspaper THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. Quite a few similar articles are appearing in the Western press today. And I must say: the support of those who oppose the natural striving of the peoples in the near abroad toward integration, especially economic, has become nearly the primary task of the diplomatic missions in Kiev today.

Talk with those people who have occasion to be at the receptions, briefings, presentations and similar gatherings of high society where they drink and eat at the expense of the hosts and receive mementos. And, if your interlocutor does not play the hypocrite, he will say that 90 percent of the

Ukrainian guests are represented precisely by those political and social forces who oppose strengthening the traditional union of Ukraine with Russia and with the other CIS countries.

You can see those same people in deputies' seats in the parliament, on the screens of Ukrainian television, and you can read their statements and predictions in the newspapers. They, as a rule, are not distinguished by diversity. The main, independent thought is that Ukraine must adhere to a pro-Western orientation and oppose the imperial ambitions of Russia which today, they say, is striving to recreate a unified state at its previous borders.

At first glance, it seems that these ideas and moods have suffered a crushing defeat in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections. Those candidates who defended Ukraine's pro-Western orientation were not supported by the people. And yet, despite their small numbers, today these people to some degree form public opinion and the policy of the state. And if we investigate and see where their onrush is leading, we have to admit that they are directed toward the destruction of the Ukrainian economy and statehood.

Today Ukraine supports one the largest armies in Europe which exceed's Germany's Bundeswehr in strength. Ukraine claims a significant portion of the Black Sea Fleet's ships and does not desire to part with strategic missiles. Approximately 60-65 percent of all of the country's budget resources are being spent on the army and strengthening it. At the same time, the minimum pension is such that it is simply impossible to live on it. Why and against whom is Ukraine arming itself? Thank God that everything is peaceful on its borders and, in contrast to Russia, it doesn't have a single "hot spot". And it is difficult to suggest that "hot spots" will be able to appear in the future. Only in a horrible dream can one imagine that the miners of Rostov and Donetsk oblasts will resort to hand-to-hand combat against each other. Or that the residents of Chernigovsk, Bryansk or Gomel oblasts will take up their pitchforks.

It is becoming increasingly clear to many sensible politicians that today a unique chance is appearing for the Ukrainian government to resolve its difficult economic problems. Let's imagine for a moment that a large-scale treaty on friendship and union with Russia has been concluded. That Ukraine, having secured the guarantees of the world community, has declared itself to be not only nonnuclear but also a neutral and demilitarized state. Only a border ground and navy guard have remained instead of a modern 700,000 man army and navy, air force and strategic missile troops. How much money could the country direct toward reform of the economy and the realization of social programs!

All of this is quite real and possible, the entire course of history and the development of relations with neighbors prompts us precisely toward that scenario.

But if all of that is so advantageous and clear, why isn't it being done? Why is Ukraine continuing to spend on military goals in spite of the catastrophic shortage of resources and the impoverishment of the people?

Because the "defenders of democracy" and the fighters against "Russia's imperial ambitions" in society, parliament, and the mass media are constantly yelling about the

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threat from the East and the need to keep our powder dry in order to oppose a possible aggressor.

It must be admitted that still quite recently it was thought that these moods—are the personal convictions of the representatives of the pro-Western social forces and movements. But the article from the American press is opening eyes to the actual state of affairs. Anti-Russian hysteria, the anticipation of conflicts, and infringements on Ukraine's independence and sovereignty are frequently turning out to be a portion of the future strategic plan, the long-term goal of which is preventing the strengthening of the countries that are located in Eastern Europe.

And God forbid that the healthy forces in Ukrainian society understand that their enemy is not in the east but among those people who want to impede the natural aspiration of people for friendship and economic and cultural integration.

Novokramatorsk Shows Formerly Secret Wares

95UM0032A Donetsk DONBASS in Russian 18 Oct 94
p 1

[Article by DONBASS correspondent Oleg Plutalov: "The Curtain of Secrecy Has Fallen: Report From the Central Square of Kramatorsk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] People recall every holiday for a long time, especially their own local holiday. The residents of Kramatorsk remember the days of celebration dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Novokramatorsk Machine Plant [NKMZ] joint-stock company. There were concerts, and exhibits, and sports competitions, and so forth. But the most astonishing and unprecedented spectacle was the exposition of articles with the trademark NKMZ that were secret for many years. It was possible to "catch a glimpse" of them perhaps only in the dead of night on heavy trucks covered with canvass speeding to the station and the airport, in view of urgency. It can be said with confidence that 99 percent of Kramatorsk residents only learned what they look like at the end of September on the city's central square.

There is a machine that resembles an illustration for a fantasy novel: a platform on crawlers that has a small cabin with armor protection and bulletproof triplex glass. Various interchangeable devices are mounted on it: scraper and bulldozer knives, a robot boom to which are attached either an excavation scoop or a lifting mechanism, and much else that makes this "peaceful tank" truly universal. And although the unit carries the official name "engineering obstacle clearing machine," it is capable not only of clearing various kinds of obstructions, but also of conducting auxiliary load-lifting work, dismantling various structures, uprooting trees, stripping operations, etc. It is more difficult to say what it—this robot—cannot do! And if you also consider that it "runs" at a speed of 60 kilometers per hour, overcoming relatively deep water obstacles and, using all three types of liquid fuel, it can work in heat and cold, under a high degree of radiation, then the fantastic and at the same time real picture will almost be complete. It is with good reason that the IMR [engineering obstacle clearing machine] took part in clearing up the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and that it worked on the famous Afghan Salang Pass and in Spitak after the earthquake.

The imagination of Kramatorsk residents was also struck by the huge 19-meter (if necessary, it could be expanded another 15 meters) tower-pole erected firmly on enormous lattice legs. It is said that stormy winds are no problem for it. At the very top, like a silver sail, glistens a powerful radar antenna. This is a mobile structure, even though this is hard to believe, considering its gigantic dimensions. And it serves for long-range detection of missiles and aircraft of a potential enemy. Specialists claim that in a number of features the system is superior to the vaunted Patriot. However, for service, as the saying goes, it is also suitable for a peaceful cosmos.

In general, Novokramatorsk residents have invested a lot of effort, knowledge, talent, and enthusiasm in the cosmos. The new exposition of the plant museum, whose windows front the square, where the miraculous equipment has been on display these days, finally told this story. Documents and photographs show what a great contribution the plant workers made to the creation of the missile-space complex at Baykonur: erectors, transport-erector units, special cranes, protection devices, and various ground equipment created at the enterprise over four decades. Part of the exposition details the equipment produced to service the Proton, the Buran-Energiya complex, and the purely Ukrainian complex Zenit.

Overall the work was for defense—the many years of tradition of Novokramatorsk residents dates back to the very first days of the formation of the collective. Armaments were already being produced at that time that were superior to world models in many parameters. For example, the test range mount for the 406-millimeter gun intended for battleships of the Sovetskiy Soyuz type. This gun was superior in its characteristics to the long-range cannon of the famous German battleship Bismarck.

However, times change, and the minds of former defense industry workers are occupied with questions of conversion. The result of this work was, for example, the hydraulically operated lift based on the undercarriage of the KrAZ [Kremenchug Automobile Plant] automobile. The height of the lift is 29 meters, and the overhang of the boom is 20 meters. It is designed for high construction of energy installations. The traveling crane on crawlers can work under conditions of the North and also in the desert. Other equipment is also being developed. Part of it was also being demonstrated on the festive square.

Attitudes on Language & Bilingualism in Ukraine

95UM0020A Moscow LESNAYA GAZETA in Russian
4 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by LESNAYA GAZETA Correspondent V. Kuznechikov: "It's a Question of Bilingualism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In the near future, I want to propose amendments to legislation that is in force which will impart to Russian the status of an official language while preserving the status of the state language for Ukrainian," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said after taking the oath. At the request of "Hot Line" Press Center (don't confuse it with the LESNAYA GAZETA "Hot Line". The designation is ours, associates have others), Political Scientist Vladimir Malinkovich comments on the President's words.

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—On November 1, 1991, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine. Article 3 of this Declaration guarantees to all peoples and national groups of our state the right of free utilization of various languages in all spheres of social life, including education, production, and the receipt and dissemination of information. That article states that the Russian language can be employed on an equal basis with the state language in areas that are densely populated with Russians, that is, we are talking about the real equality of the two languages everywhere because Russians live in all regions of Ukraine.

At the same time, certain provisions of the Law on Languages contradict Article 3 of the Declaration. Therefore, it would be appropriate to raise in the Supreme Soviet the issue of introducing amendments to the law that regulates the use of languages. In the process, Ukrainian must remain the state language of interethnic relations and be used as the single language in those state organs and institutions where bilingualism cannot be used. For example, this applies to military regulations.

Incidentally, according to sociological research data, approximately 18 percent of the population advocates the functioning of the single Ukrainian language on the territory of Ukraine and more than 40 percent advocate bilingualism. More than 36 percent are for one state language and actual bilingualism. The overwhelming majority of the population, as we can see, do not support the idea of one language.

BALTIC STATES

Latvian Parliament Confirms New Armed Forces Commander

95UM0025A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Gromak: "New Commander for the Armed Forces of Latvia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The parliament affirmed Yuris Dalbinsh, first deputy chief of staff of the Latvian militia, for the post of commander of the national Armed Forces of Latvia.

Lieutenant Colonel of the Militia Dalbinsh was born in 1954 and in 1979 he finished the Latvian State Institute for Physical Culture. In Germany, he took courses on military leadership in the staff of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. Upon taking up his new post, Dalbinsh declared that he considers his immediate task to be that of forming the staff of the national Armed Forces of Latvia, which will coordinate the actions of the country's military structures. The new commander thinks that Latvia needs professional armed forces in the future.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Strict Measures Against Army Deserters

954K0097A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 8 Oct 94 p 1

[Report by M. Ogandzhanyan, under the "Press Conference" rubric: "Draft Dodgers Will Have a Hard Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's press conference of RA [Republic of Armenia] State Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan was devoted to the current problems of the military, in particular, with respect to the draft. The state minister appraised the latest drafts in the republic as successful, especially comparing the indicators with other republics of the former Soviet Union. "The most important part," emphasized V. Sarkisyan, "is for the population to develop awareness of their civic duty to the republic and the fact that national security depends on each of its citizens."

"Unfortunately, to this day the principle of social justice is not observed, and this harms very much our common interests and inflicts moral damage on those who honestly fulfill their patriotic duty."

From now on, the struggle against deserters and draft dodgers will be conducted seriously, with the use of political, economic, and moral levers. As Mr. Sarkisyan reported, lists have been compiled of all those who in one way or the other have been or are now derelict in fulfilling their military duty. There are three such lists. The first, which the minister called the "black list," includes the names of soldiers drafted in the spring or fall of 1992, or in the spring of 1993, who deserted their military units and did not report back within six months, that is, "definite deserters." The second list includes those who were drafted in the fall of 1993 or in the spring of 1994 and deserted their military units, as well as persons who dodged all drafts held in the republic. Both lists have been distributed to all ministries, organs of executive authority, and institutions of higher learning in the republic for study and distribution to all lower level organizations, with the instruction to report to corresponding organs of internal affairs or military draft offices whenever someone on the list is identified. Administrative penalties are envisaged for hiding deserters and abetting them.

The third among the lists mentioned by the state minister includes the names of those who dodged the fall draft of 1994 and the spring draft of 1994. These young people have the chance to avoid getting on the "black list" if they report to military draft offices during the upcoming fall draft.

"We will strive," noted Mr. Sarkisyan, "to make these lists one of the staples of record-keeping work in all republic structures, up to airports' ticket windows. Their presence will be monitored by the Ministry of Defense leadership and by me personally. Thus, the deserters will become outcasts across the entire republic. Strictest economic sanctions will be applied to them—for instance, privatization certificates will be issued to such persons only if they show up in person to receive them: Getting them by issuing a power of attorney to relatives will not be permitted. The same goes for privatization of housing and land."

"We have ahead of us a protracted, difficult, and unpleasant all-out struggle. Years and decades will pass; governments and political trends will change, but the people who have shirked their sacred duty to the motherland will carry the burden of punishment all their lives."

On the other hand, even the persons included in the first list have a chance to become worthy citizens of the republic and atone for their misdeeds. As the state minister noted, a

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coordinating group on combating draft dodging and desertion is working in the RA Officers' House. It includes representatives of the republic Ministry of Defense, the government, the military procuracy, and other competent structures. Three times a week the group will see individuals and consider their petitions. All who intend to return voluntarily to military units are obliged to appear before this commission. In the event that a citizen's rights have been violated, or a conflict had arisen in the military unit that makes it impossible for the soldier to return there, the commission will treat the case on an individual basis. Those included on the "black list" have three chances to be forgiven: In exceptional cases their complaints will be considered and the guilty parties punished; if they deserted without a valid reason, they may, as Mr. Sarkisyan put it, "start with a clean slate," that is, restart the service from the beginning. And finally, the last option—to finish service in a disciplinary battalion. If they miss this chance, they cannot count on clemency and will be considered criminals.

Regarding the upcoming drafts, Mr. Sarkisyan said that three-month training camps for reserve officers will begin in October, and the call-up for active service—on 1 November. The Supreme Council currently is considering the question of lengthening the service to two years. This way, the quality of soldiers' training will be improved, and the "efficiency coefficient" of the service increased. There is also the intent to conduct a draft once a year in the future. The state minister did not confirm the rumors of a longer training camp period for reserve officers.

Answering questions, Mr. Sarkisyan agreed that desertions in the military also stem from internal causes. One of the working group's tasks is to correct at least some of them. There is no question, however, that our national army already exists, albeit it is still in the stage of formation.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Russian Presence in Defense Staff Noted

954K0043A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Sep 94 p 3

[Report by Oleg Panfilov under the "Tajikistan" rubric: "Clashes at the Khobu-Rabad Pass: Abdulladzhonov's Supporters Look for Allies in Badakhshan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It looks as if another attempt to bring about a political settlement by both parties to the conflict may be used as an argument in explaining their actions. Immediately after signing in Tehran a temporary ceasefire agreement (it goes into effect immediately upon the arrival of UN observers in Tajikistan), the government troops counterattacked the opposition in the area of the Khobu-Rabad pass. According to reports from Khorog, on 19 September at 1000 an armored convoy of 40 vehicles began an offensive, and the government troops and opposition brigades clashed near the Safedsang settlement. As a result, six people were killed and seven wounded on the opposition side. The attack was supported by military aircraft and helicopters of, according to reports, unidentified origin. Thus, the situation at the Khobu-Rabad pass changed; it is now controlled by the opposition on the Tavildara side, while a tank battalion of government troops is stationed across it. At the same time, opposition sources

report that Field Commander Khokim's detachment continues to hold its positions in the area between Komsomolabad and Fayzabad Rayon centers.

Last Saturday trucks carrying humanitarian aid from Leninabad Oblast arrived in Badakhshan. The convoy is led by Major General Ergash Kurbanov, Tajikistan people's deputy and chairman of the Ministry of Security's oblast administration. He introduced himself as an authorized representative of the presidential candidate Abdumalik Abdulladzhonov and handed over to Badakhshan authorities 15 tonnes of flour, 400 kg of rice, and other foodstuffs. In a conversation with local journalists, he asserted that the fate of Emomali Rakhmonov is already sealed and that Abdulladzhonov would become president of Tajikistan no matter what.

However, while Abdumalik Abdulladzhonov's supporters are currently trying to use quite diplomatic steps (as, for instance, humanitarian aid) in their search for supporters, the authorities still count on resolving the situation by use of force. At the meeting in Tehran, the government delegation maintained that Rakhmonov will become president, and nobody will vote for Abdulladzhonov. At the same time, Dushanbe is trying to seize the initiative from the opposition by launching offensives in the areas where the government troops were defeated before. It appears that the regime, spending the last supplies of fuel, is willing to allocate the gasoline and solar oil, which are in short supply, for armored vehicles instead of for powering cotton-picking machines. Meanwhile, no economic cargo has been coming from the territory of Uzbekistan since 27 August, and Tajikistan residents are experiencing an acute shortage of foodstuffs, first and foremost bread.

On 19 September a statement of the Tajikistan MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] was read out on Tajik television, which says that the authorities know "the places where the opposition concentrates" but are not conducting "combat liberation operations," because a temporary ceasefire agreement was signed in Tehran. Nevertheless, the MVD statement says, "several opposition groups have already been liquidated."

From this apparently it follows that the temporary ceasefire agreement will be used by the authorities as propaganda of their peace-loving stance, and at the same time, in the opinion of observers, Dushanbe will attempt to seize the military initiative from the opposition in the eight to 10 days remaining until the arrival of UN observers.

The independent newspaper CHAROGI RUZ published in its latest, fifth, issue the list of the staff of the Tajikistan Ministry of Defense [MO], which was provided by one of the government troops officers taken prisoner by the opposition in the Tavildara fighting on 20-21 July. One could only speculate on the subject of the Tajikistan MO's personnel roster, not only on the basis of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's promises to assist in the building of the republic armed forces, but also by such a factor as the absence of their own cadre officers in Tajikistan. The captured officer contends that most of the Tajikistan MO staff are Russian officers, a large number of whom had been through the Afghan war: 1. Major General Shishlyannikov—minister of defense. 2. Major General Chubarov—deputy minister of defense. 3. Colonel Chisnakov—

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operational department officer. 4. Colonel Chubrik—operational department officer. 5. Colonel Glukhov—operational department officer. 6. Colonel Shishkin—temporary acting chief of staff. 7. Colonel Vorobyev—chief of motor vehicle service. 8. Colonel Vasilyev—chief of armaments (rocketry and artillery armaments). 9. Colonel Bicheykin—chief of engineering service. 10. Colonel Vakulin—deputy chief of engineering service. 11. Colonel Shiganov—chief of organizational service. 12. Colonel Mamedov (Azerbaijani)—chief of food service. 13. Colonel Isakov—operational department officer. 14. Colonel Vasilyev—chief of intelligence. 15. Colonel Selivanov—operational department officer. 16. Colonel Begmatov (Uzbek)—deputy minister for armaments. 17. Colonel Vasilyev—deputy chief for armaments. 18. Major Kushlik—chief of materials service. 19. Major Shafikov Rinat (Tatar)—intelligence officer. 20. Lieutenant Colonel Davydenko—intelligence officer. 21. Colonel Azarov—deputy chief for combat training. 22. Colonel Gavrish—deputy minister for combat training. 23. Colonel Prokofev—operational department officer. 24. Colonel Kim—commander, 1st brigade. 25. Lieutenant Colonel Taymanov—senior officer, personnel department.

Russian Role in Conflict Questioned

954K0043B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Sep 94 p 3

[Report by Oleg Panfilov under the "Tajikistan" rubric: "Soldiers' Mothers' of St. Petersburg Against General Grachev: Abdulladzhonov's Supporters Accuse Rakhmonov of Violating the Law on Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The coordinating council of the public human rights organization Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg distributed a statement, in which they express their attitude toward the latest statements of Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev. Information agencies reported the minister's latest threats against anti-government groups in Tajikistan. In Nizhny Novgorod, Pavel Grachev said, for instance: "If the national political leadership makes such a decision (handing protection of Tajik-Afghan border over to the Ministry of Defense—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA), we will considerably reinforce the group of troops in the region, and move the necessary equipment and armaments there, which will allow us to deflect a real outside aggression."

The reaction of these words of Grachev came from both Dushanbe and St. Petersburg. Abdumajid Dostiyev, first deputy chairman of the Tajikistan Supreme Council, attempted to give an image of sovereign state to his country, saying that "no soldier of a foreign state will set foot on our soil." Soldiers' Mothers of St. Petersburg made a rather categorical demarche on this occasion. Their statement says: "At first glance, it looks like a purely organizational matter: Does it make any difference which agency will be in charge of the contingent protecting the border?" However, in the Soldiers' Mothers' opinion, the proposed "reorganization will mean not only a quantitative expansion of our troops' participation in the conflict, but also a transition to a new, more serious capacity." The statement's authors emphasize that they "do not intend to discuss the political expediency of Russia's entry in the Tajik war," but "our servicemen already are dying in Tajikistan, while the command, in violation of the law, sends soldiers to a 'hot spot' without asking their consent."

It is unlikely that the situation is perceived unambiguously by the Russian military in Tajikistan either. Pavel Grachev replaced General Pyankov, the commander of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces, with General Patrikeyev. But it looks as if Valeriy Patrikeyev realized quite quickly that drawing the Russian military contingent into a Tajik internal conflict is fraught with the danger of proliferation of war, which would mean not only peril for the Russian soldiers, but also exacerbation of anti-Russian moods both in Tajikistan and in the entire of Central Asia. General Patrikeyev withdrew "in time" from using the Russian equipment and soldiers during the offensive taken by the opposition in July in Tavildara.

Information agencies over the past few days reported on the amnesty announced by Tajik authorities on 25 August. Different information, each quoting government sources, places the number of persons released from prisons between 500 and 1,500. However, according to opposition sources, none of those whom the authorities call anti-government elements—that is, the opposition—have yet been released. In reality, and this is said in the decree on amnesty, those being released from prisons are People's Front members and criminals (which is most often one and the same), since, in keeping with the decree, only those who recognize the current authority as legitimate, as well as those convicted under no more than one article, fall under the amnesty. They are mainly former confederates of the People's Front leader Sangak Safarov sentenced for murders, maraudery, and robberies rather than their political views. Nevertheless, this action on the part of the authorities is being presented as a concession to the opposition.

According to ITAR-TASS, supporters of Abdumalik Abdulladzhonov—a candidate for the Tajikistan presidency—lodged a protest in connection with the incidents of violation of the Tajik law on presidential elections. Abdulladzhonov's initiative group made available to the press a statement, which tells of the broad propaganda campaign in support of Emomali Rakhmonov in the state-owned mass media; that state officials on their official trips to various regions of the republic conduct agitation and propaganda, exerting pressure on local authorities, and exhorting the population to vote for Emomali Rakhmonov. The statement says: "We believe that in such conditions it is impossible to conduct an equal and fair struggle for the constituents' votes."

Background, Development of Tajik Border Conflict

95UM0001B Moscow ORIYENTIR in Russian No 2,
Aug 1994 (signed to press 12 Aug 94) pp 12-17

[Article by Captain Igor Chernyshov, columnist for ORIYENTIR magazine: "Tajikistan: Concerns and Hopes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until quite recently, we could judge how many troubles, misfortunes, and sufferings people suffered from the civil war only from history books and movies. Today, fratricidal wars are a terrible reality of life in a number of republics of the former Soviet Union. Among them is Tajikistan, being torn apart by an inter-clan massacre, which is very similar to the civil strife in Afghanistan that developed into an endless war.

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Having become independent states after the collapse of the USSR, the former Soviet republics have significantly changed the nature and structure of international relations within regions adjacent to Central Asia. Their geo-strategic importance is largely determined by the fact that they are quite rich in energy-bearing raw materials, minerals, and other natural resources in which the world market is interested, are geographically located in the proximity of two nuclear powers—Russia and China, and have an outlet to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via Iran and Afghanistan. With completion of construction of the Trans-Asiatic Railroad and the development of highways, air service, and oil and gas pipelines, Central Asia's importance will increase even more.

However, the events in Tajikistan and the tension on the Tajik-Afghan border are a destabilizing factor today for all of the Central Asian region.

For all the years of Soviet power, for a number of reasons Tajikistan was a backward republic of the USSR for standard of living. Mountains occupy 93 percent of the republic's territory, which interferes with communication between areas and the laying of lines of communication. Just several dozen kilometers from Dushanbe you might not see a water line or other elementary boons of civilization, and water is the object of buying and selling in many areas of the republic today.

In these conditions, a steady division of spheres of influence and power along clan and territorial lines has taken shape. From the suburbs of the cities of Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab, where the main industrial production was concentrated and food products were produced, a considerable portion of the incomes was redistributed throughout the rest of the regions of the republic. On the other hand, in structures of power, the shadow economy, other key sectors, and the criminal environment, the residents of Pamir have firmly retained leadership. And most of the Pamir residents have led a beggarly existence: in the fall, the roads to them to the mountains were closed by snowdrifts, and the people began to live on old stocks.

Clashes between residents of Pamir, Kurgan-Tyube, and Kulyab have flared up since time immemorial. In recent years this contradiction has grown even more acute: residents of Kulyab accused power structures of corruption and unfair distribution of spheres of influence. Tajikistan's acquiring independence served as an impetus for armed conflict. For a question immediately arose: Who would rule the sovereign state?

As it turned out, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan were ready for the Tajik "independence" already long ago. In addition to drugs, money, and weapons, Islamic propaganda literature has flowed across the border into Tajikistan. Quite specific interests were being pursued. For example, a number of leaders of the Afghan mujahedin and field commanders, primarily from among Islamic fundamentalists and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, using slogans of ethnic, language, and religious identity with the peoples living in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, revived the idea of Moslem nationalism, setting the task of "liberating" the Moslems of Central Asia and uniting them into a so-called "Great Turkestan." Southern neighbors dreamed of gaining control over the exploitation of minerals in Pamir

and Gissaro-Alay (gold, tungsten ore, antimony, mercury, arsenic, boron, and so forth) and oil, gas, and coal in Tajikistan and Fergana. The expenses of the "interested parties" produced the first fruits in 1990, when the Party of Islamic Revival [PIV] was registered. Its leaders, with the help of the numerous supporters that had joined them on the democratic wave, was able to carry out a coup d'etat. President Rakhmon Nabyev renounced power under the sight of assault rifles.

The seething popular masses needed an idea for the sake of which they could experience all these upheavals. It was offered by the advocates of Islamic fundamentalism.

Democratic slogans obviously did not blend into the framework of conservative Islam. And Islam itself, in the form in which it exists, say, in Iran, was alien to the absolute majority of the people of Tajikistan. Still, the neighbors' money was not wasted: as a result, the new and hard-to-explain concept of "democratic Islamism" emerged. The universal nature of the idea was obvious: the intelligentsia and young people, longing for big changes, were seduced by the word "democratic," and residents of outlying areas were seduced by stories of an "Iranian Islamic paradise."

Thus, the Tajik people, having spoken out against party bureaucracy, one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union saw Islam in power in the person of the leaders of the PIV and the organization of Pamir clans.

Television began to actively propagandize Islamic fundamentalism and call for further democratic reforms. The central and southern areas of the republic were loyal to the new power. Leadership of the Kulyab and Leninabad oblasts did not recognize the "unconstitutional government" and began to create armed formations.

In response, Islamists blocked deliveries of food and other cargo to the mutinous Kulyab. A famine began there: only 50 grams of bread were issued per person in a 24-hour period...

The wave of dissatisfaction against the new power had grown by late 1990 as it began to demonstrate its "sharp" nature. Fighters ruthlessly pillaged apartments, stores, and shops. Columns daily moved on Pamir with property, which, for the most part, was then exchanged for Afghan drugs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs began to cooperate with the new government of democrat-Islamists.

Afghanistan, although it was not in a position to help the "changes" materially, unlike its neighbors who built dozens of mosques in Tajikistan, also did not remain on the sidelines. The Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, and the Movement of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan trained Tajik fighters in their camps.

There soon became more than enough armed and well-trained fighters in the republic: "death caravans" have safely crossed the Tajik-Afghan border. Mass rally passions of oppositionists on Sakhidon Square in front of the Council of Ministers building and on Ozadi Square, where supporters of Rakhmon Nabyev gathered, developed into an open armed confrontation. The first shots were heard in the oblast center of Kurgan-Tyube. Then combat operations

already with all the elements of modern combat developed throughout the southern part of the republic.

It was fairly difficult to figure out who was fighting whom. It can be said that the democrat-Islamists were fighting the communists, the separatists were fighting the internalists, the residents of Pamir were fighting the residents of Kulyab. In any case, this was only partially true. The truth today lies somewhat deeper. For simplicity, some were called "vovchiks," and others were called "yurchiks."

However, dividing them into "vovchiks" (i.e., those against Nabiyeu) and "yurchiks" (supporters of the ex-president) is quite arbitrary, since with the development of the bloody conflict, more and more new people have been dragged into it, including on the grounds of a vendetta for those who died. In addition, there exist a great number of various local self-defense detachments in the republic protecting their villages with weapons in their hands against any encroachments. Some armed groups partially profess the ideas of both conflicting sides. There also exist quite a few openly bandit formations pursuing in the heat of civil war only their own selfish objectives and engaging in robbery, kidnapping, and extortion.

Amidst all this confusion, up to now only one force remained and remains neutral. This is the 201st Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], which before the collapse of the USSR was part of the Turkestan Military District and in 1992 was taken under the jurisdiction of Russia. From the very start of combat operations, both sides did everything they could (right up to blackmail, threats, or maybe open provocations) to draw the 201st Division into the war. But it invariably followed the declared neutrality and, wherever possible, prevented bloodshed and saved the peaceful population. Finding themselves at the epicenter of a civil war, the Russian troops somehow kept it from spreading. The Russian border guards saved the Tajik-Afghan border from collapse. This was increasingly more difficult with each day. Having suffered defeat in clashes with government troops in the summer of 1993, the armed opposition preserved its main forces. Part of the fighters dispersed in the mountainous areas of Tajikistan. A fairly large grouping ended up in neighboring Afghanistan, where it settled in 14 specially created military camps. The largest of them are located near the Afghan cities of Kunduz, Talyan, Khodzhar, Pandzhsher, and Feyzabad. Under the leadership of Afghan, Pakistani, and Iranian instructors, Tajik fighters were trained to carry out Operation Retaliation, aimed at the annexation of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and turning it into a new Islamic state.

Russia's border guard forces on the Tajik-Afghan border (Moskovskiy, Pyandzh, Khorog, and Ishkashim border guard detachments) barely handled the "death caravans" that streamed across the border river Pyandzh. "From beyond the small river" the fighters carried across assault rifles and ammunition, mines, grenade launchers, recoilless guns, and even Stinger portable surface-to-air missiles systems. The fighters switched from the tactic of "quiet infiltration" to open armed border penetrations.

However, after the tragic events at the 12th Border Guard Outpost, the security and defense regime of the Tajik-Afghan border, on Russia's recommendation, was significantly reinforced with military subunits from neighboring

countries of the region. Initially, each assigned 500 people. Then on 24 September 1993, the heads of state of the parties to the Collective Security Treaty signed an agreement on creating Collective Peacekeeping Forces [CPF] in Tajikistan.

Together with the Russian border guards and their supporting subunits from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and government troops of Tajikistan, the CPF closed the border more tightly and ensured its reliable security and defense.

A reinforced Uzbek battalion was positioned near the populated point of Shaartuz in the immediate proximity to the Tajik-Afghan border and covered the most likely avenues of armed penetrations by fighters in the Russian Pyandzh border guard detachment's area of responsibility.

Kazakhstan's military contingent reinforced the Khorog border guard detachment (Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast) and then provided security for the Khorog Airport. Part of the forces from Kyrgyzstan were quartered in the city of Murgab (GBAO), and another part in the locality of Sary-Tash, guarding the East Pamir Highway. Another battalion from Kyrgyzstan was sent to reinforce the Ishkashim border guard detachment.


Having encountered unusually harsh conditions, the fighters began to change their tactics and improve the structure of their armed detachments. Along the entire Tajik-Afghan border they created so-called fronts—compact groupings of Tajik fighters and Afghan mujahedin: Shaartuz-Kabodiyen (about 3,000 men), Pyandzh (over 3,000), Kulyab (3,000), and Badakhshan (2,000 Tajik fighters and 2,000 Afghan mujahedin). The last grouping, under the command of General Davlat Usmon, is very well armed and, should the situation become aggravated, using a quick maneuver, ready to join the "internal" opposition in Tajikistan, which, in the opinion of the commander in chief of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev, numbers about 4,000-5,000 fighters, most located in the Garm Group of Areas.

These groupings are scattered, but routine armed provocations "from beyond the small river" are often supported by fighters from the territory of Tajikistan. And this must be taken into account. However, it is unlikely that it is possible to break through the reinforced border today.

'Blue helmets' of the Commonwealth, the 201st MRD, and Russian border guards have done the main thing—the civil war in the republic has been stopped. There now is a chance for a political and military settlement and the opportunity to forget the horrors of civil war. However, the situation in Tajikistan and in the northern border areas of Afghanistan remains complex and explosive. The war has stopped, but up to now there is no peace.

Only one way out of the situation that has been created comes to mind—negotiations and a political settlement of the conflict. However, the consultations begun in April of this year by delegations of official authorities and representatives of the opposition, essentially have changed nothing. In the first round of negotiations in Moscow under the aegis of the UN and through the mediation of Russia, the government delegation refused to sign a formal cease-fire agreement proposed by the opposition.

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--disposition areas of Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF)



--concentration areas of Tajik fighters and Afghan mujahedin

In Tajikistan itself, several loud murders take place almost daily, and people of various social positions and political sympathies are becoming victims of "unknown armed people." People from Nabiyeu's team, heads of industrial enterprises, journalists, businessmen, and servicemen are being killed.

Harsh confrontation between the official leadership of the republic and opposition forces and the opposition's readiness, if negotiations do not produce a peaceful outcome, to use force of arms to seize power are reducing the prospects of a political settlement of the conflict.

In the opinion of experts, penetration of the Tajik-Afghan border and the coming to power of opposition forces can lead to the following dangerous consequences for the entire region of Central Asia: a bloody massacre in Tajikistan as a result of the settling of scores by the opposing sides; a Tajik-Uzbek conflict, since the opposition considers Uzbekistan to be primarily responsible for the situation in Tajikistan; a possible Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict in Osh and a Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict between residents of Isfarinskiy Rayon of Tajikistan and Batkenskii Rayon of Kyrgyzstan. Dragging the countries of Central Asia into the Tajik conflict threatens to destroy the southern border of the CIS and generally redo the entire map of this region.

This, of course, is the worst-case variant. All the same, it must not be disregarded. A second round of negotiations between the official leadership and opposition forces of Tajikistan have still not brought the sides to a political consensus. In the opinion of some analysts, the negotiation process has come to an impasse once and for all.

How will events develop further and what position will Russia take? According to some analysts, the present government of Tajikistan will not last without its help. You see, it is Russia that is keeping the republic's economy afloat, and about 20,000 of its soldiers are guarding Tajikistan's borders. During the past year alone, Russian border guards engaged border violators in combat 400 times on the Tajik-Afghan borders. In doing so, about 700 fighters were destroyed. However, Russian servicemen will also die and pay with their lives for the inability of the opposing sides to find a way to come to an agreement.

The need for the presence of Russian troops is explained, in particular, by the existence of a Russian-speaking population in Tajikistan and Russia's lack of properly equipped borders. However, according to some estimates, already today Tajikistan has abandoned about 300,000 Russian-speaking residents here. It is not ruled out that by the end of this year, the rest may also move to Russia. Russia is

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gradually outfitting its own border, and the states that are located between Tajikistan and Russia are also establishing borders. Will Russia's strategy change in this case?

The opinions of experts and analysts on this account are divided. Some believe that the threat of Islamic fundamentalism for both Tajikistan and Russia is obviously exaggerated, and the absence of the Russian population factor should remove the problem of guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. Others insist on preserving a presence in the area of "Russia's geo-political interests."

It looks like Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also adhered to this viewpoint. The minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrey Kozyrev, was saying at the beginning of this year that if our troops leave Tajikistan,

millions of refugees will surge onto the territory of Russia, and he emphasized: "We cannot and will not allow this. So, they must remain."

Nevertheless, recently comments by columnists have begun appearing in the mass media about the fact that despite the assertions of politicians and analysts, Russia today is gradually leaving Central Asia and, in particular, Tajikistan. As confirmation of this, they cite the recently announced program of settling 11 million refugees from the near abroad in Russia.

Be that as it may, as before, Russian servicemen are guarding the Tajik-Afghan border, ensuring stability, and protecting the lives of peaceful people.

ARMS TRADE

Commentary on Kuwaiti BMP-3 Sale

95UM0028B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Oct 94
p 13

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "\$800,000 for a BMP-3"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The contract signed by the Russian state company "Rosvooruzheniye" and the Ministry of Defense of Kuwait for the delivery of 60 infantry fighting vehicles BMP-3 to Kuwait had the effect of an exploding bomb. Who could imagine that the country whose liberation from Iraqi occupation was achieved in the course of the war in the Persian Gulf mainly through American and other Western weapons would suddenly decide to purchase combat equipment from Russia?

Why did Kuwait prefer the Russian infantry fighting vehicle rather than the American M113 APC that was used by the coalition forces? There may be several answers. In my view, however, Arkadiy Shipunov, general designer at the Tula Design Bureau, is closer than anyone else to the truth: "The fact is that the BMP-3 is distinguished from all the other infantry fighting vehicles in that the others are primary intended for the delivery of personnel to the site of the battle, whereas the BMP-3 has on its armor a complex of arms that allows it to participate equally in battle with armored vehicles and tanks and even to defeat them."

Indeed, of all the infantry fighting vehicles only the BMP-3 possesses a comprehensive system of arms that includes: a 100-mm semiautomatic gun—launcher for guided antitank missiles that is capable of destroying targets with fragmentation-type munitions 30F32 as well as with a 9M117 missile guided by laser beam that is fired through a barrel; a 30-mm automatic gun 2A72 coupled with a 100-mm gun; and a 7.62-mm Kalashnikov tank machinegun. All of this is mounted in a single block on the vehicle turret and is linked with a system for fire control.

It also has a trailer aiming and guidance device with a built-in range finder (with a laser system for sighting and with an imaging infrared sensor), a trailer for the gunner-operator, a ballistic calculator or mini-computer, and also a monocular commander trailer and a day-night commander aiming and guidance device. This is in the event that the commander wants to give a target designation to one of the three members of the crew. There is also a two-plane electric weapons stabilizer and a prisma device with a fiber-optic system for the imaging of the mark. All of this makes it possible for the crew to direct fire not only at armored targets on the ground and to destroy the open or concealed personnel of the enemy but also to destroy air targets—aircraft and helicopters. Stationary, moving, or afloat.

Besides this weaponry, two autonomous 7.62-mm Kalashnikov tank machineguns are mounted on the BMP-3 and there are also six AK-74 assault rifles and a 26-mm signal pistol.

Another very important tactical-technical characteristics of the BMP-3 is the range of firing with live shells—equal to 7 km—and with guided antitank missiles—from 100 to 5,500 meters. Its armor-penetrating capability behind dynamic protection (this means that it also overcomes a special

explosive layer mounted on the tanks that repels shaped-charge projectiles) is equal to 650 mm. This is the thickness of the armor of the "strongest" tank.

The BMP-3 has 8 such guided antitank missiles and there are another 22 conventional fragmentation-type projectiles placed under the revolving floor of the commander's turret in a conveyor loading mechanism. The relationship between missiles and projectiles may change, however. This depends on the mission. There are 500 30-mm projectiles with fragmentation-type charges and armor-piercing and armor-igniting projectiles and 2,000 machinegun cartridges.

The crew of the fighting vehicle is made up of three individuals (commander, driver, and gunner-operator) but there is also room in it for a motorized rifle compartment for seven to nine soldiers. Its weight fully loaded is 19 tonnes.

But in speaking of the combat advantages of the BMP-3 over other vehicles of the same class, one must not fail to mention its engine and running gear. The 4-cycle, 10-cylinder, V-shaped diesel engine with liquid cooling and a V-angle of 144 degrees has 500 horse-power. This makes it possible for the vehicle to attain a speed of 70 km an hour across rough terrain (not every jeep can do this) and makes the BMP very maneuverable and not very vulnerable to the fire of the opposing side. In addition, this same engine helps it to swim in the water at a speed of 10 km an hour. The range of the fighting vehicle is 600 km on one load of fuel.

The BMP has been tested for durability in the deserts of Arabia and has competed well against the M113 and other analogous Western vehicles.

Prior to this, it has been tested in the sands of Kara-Kuma at temperatures of 55 degrees Celsius. The air conditioner that is installed in its assault-force and commander compartments and also fed to the driver's seat did not let them down.

The BMP-3 is priced in the world market and the price differs greatly depending on to whom it is sold, in what quantities it is sold, what equipment it has, and what obligations the seller has for its continued servicing and provision with spare parts and munitions. On the average, however, the cost of one vehicle, according to world information agencies, is somewhere in the range of \$800,000.

Ministry Denies Transfer of Arms to Serbs, Syrians

95UM0027A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 94 p 1

[Report from the Information and Press Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Russia: "Weapons and Combat Equipment Removed to Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 September, the German newspaper WELT AM SONNTAG published an article that refers to information from Western special services and asserts that hundreds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery guns that Russia has evacuated in recent years from the Western Group of Forces and countries of Eastern Europe did not reach the places of their new deployment in Russia but supposedly were sent to Serbia and Syria.

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The Information and Press Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Russia is authorized to state that the report by WELT AM SONNTAG and its various versions disseminated by other mass media are an outright invention. All of the weapons and combat equipment from the Western Group of Forces and countries of Eastern Europe were removed to the USSR and subsequently to Russia.

Russian Participation in Greek Arms Exhibit Previewed

954F0047A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 6 Oct 94
p 3

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Russian Weapons Offered to Mediterranean Countries"; "Rise of Weapons Export Encounters Growing Resistance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The International Weapons Exhibit DEFENDORY-94 opened this week in Piraeus near Athens. Russia is also participating, but much more modestly than in the first tremendous exhibits of 1993. Then some five hundred people and an enormous quantity of military equipment were sent to Abu Dhabi in hopes of an instant sale to the Persian Gulf Arabs for 10 to 12 billion dollars, right "off the truck."

Since then the Russian sellers and producers of weapons have been convinced that although they have to participate in the exhibits to promote their wares, the number of successful contracts does not directly depend on the number of fighters and tanks exhibited to idle onlookers.

For this reason, by the autumn of 94 the commercial advertising and exhibit policy of the state company (GK) "Rosvooruzheniye" and associated producers of the military-industrial complex had changed somewhat. The decision was made to participate in a larger number of exhibits, but with a smaller number of participants, and they must cost less, depending on realistic chances of selling something in a particular region. Only negotiating experts, mockups, models, stands and videos have been sent to DEFENDORY-94, and not one full-scale model of a weapon.

Today, with the cold war over, there are hardly any countries remaining which would purchase weapons with the intention of using them directly and soon for their purpose. Except perhaps Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, and other former Yugoslavs. But they are purchasing underground, illegally, circumventing UN sanctions, and for this reason are not of much interest to law-abiding traders.

In the modern world, weapons are acquired to deter war. For this reason, political considerations often outweigh purely military-technical ones. For example, by buying weapons in the U.S., a country acquires certain American security guarantees, albeit sometimes illusory ones.

After the inept Iraqi generals were soundly thrashed during "Desert Storm," Russian (Soviet) weapons dropped abruptly out of fashion. Exports were cut, and very serious efforts were required to halt this tendency.

In 1993, Oboroneksport [Defense Export] (the former GIU [Main Engineering Administration]) and its heir the GK "Rosvooruzheniye" spent around 5 million dollars solely for the conduct of international exhibits (including a closed exhibit in China). Preparation and publishing of advertising

(including secret advertising—order articles) took two million dollars. The producers also spent money. The MAPO [Moscow Aviation Production Association] im. Dementyev (MiG aircraft) spent 3 million dollars for independent advertising and promotion (exhibits and advertising) of MiG fighters abroad.

But the majority of enterprises of the military-industrial complex simply do not have such funds, so they are all willy-nilly tied to the GK "Rosvooruzheniye," although last May the president signed an order bestowing "freedom" on the producers to export weapons themselves (to this point not a single "company" has managed to obtain a weapons exporter's certificate in accordance with this order).

Through the efforts of professional weapons traders from "Rosvooruzheniye," Russian weapons are again being bought, including in the Mediterranean. Turkey recently signed a contract to buy our weapons. A contract with Syria should be signed in the near future.

In response to a question from a *SEGODNYA* correspondent about whether Greece would follow Turkey's example, Herasimus Arsenis, the Defense Minister of Greece who was representing the Greek government at DEFENDORY-94 replied: "We are now modernizing our army and would like to reduce defense expenditures while at the same time strengthening our combat readiness. We need weapons of better quality at the lowest price, and from this standpoint we are prepared to view Russia as a possible supplier."

But the successes of Russian weapon makers, who hope to sell 5 to 6 billion dollars of military equipment in 1995, are provoking increasing resistance from competitors, especially the Americans. During the visit of President Yeltsin to America last week, official Washington did everything possible to stop the sale of weapons to Iran. And although the contracts already signed will be filled, new ones are now impossible. Representatives of "companies" of the military-industrial complex and professional weapons traders naturally are very unhappy with this concession. They still refrain from public criticism of the president, but they make no secret of their opinion in private discussions.

Our weapons makers expect from the government and the president of Russia at least the level of support which western leaders give to their own military-industrial complexes. But our president only noted in the U.S. that "our weapons are better than American ones." Evidently he thinks they are so good that there is no point in supporting ours, for they will sell themselves.

This week the old competitors in the world weapons market (the U.S., Russia, France, and England) met again in Piraeus. The Mediterranean and the adjoining Near East is one of the main weapons-buying regions, where the military-industrial complexes of all countries are in a deep depression. For many military enterprises in Europe, America and Asia, a successful export contract would resolve the further fate of people and companies: either closure and liquidation, or on to the 21st century with a few survivors, in the hope that after this depression, the production of weapons will again assume its former place in the economy of developed countries.

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Lessons From Malaysian Mig-29 Buy

95UM0027B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Oct 94 p 4

[Article by Sergey Akshintsev, expert from the Russian Fund for Foreign Economic Policy, under "In the Weapons Markets" rubric: "Lessons From the Malaysian Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The task of increasing Russian exports of complex technical mechanical production remains one of the central problems upon whose resolution depends the time when the Russian economy gets out of its present critical situation. An important place in this respect belongs to increased sales of domestic defense output abroad. And it is gratifying that recently we have more and more frequently been hearing reports of successes of our defense workers in this area and that they have ceased to be a sensation but instead are rightfully becoming customary.

At the same time, an analysis of the development of the situation with respect to Russian arms exports shows that there is still very much that needs to be done for there to be a real breakthrough in this area and for Russia to occupy its proper place in the world market.

In this connection, I would like to touch on the contract for the delivery of 18 Mig-29 fighters to Malaysia, which is the largest agreement for the export of domestic military-technical output in recent years. It is thereby important to understand the lessons from this deal, the execution of which must become a "model on the basis of which arms exports will develop," as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Oleg Soskovets declared at a special August meeting of the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation.

As the first lesson with an optimistic tone, mention should be made of the fact that the domestic defense complex is still alive, that despite the ill-conceived administrative-command model for conversion and the reduction of financing it is still capable of producing output in demand abroad, whereby in our case the Migs were able to "break through" to the Malaysian market, completely new to Russia, where traditionally Western exporters have dominated.

That is, the creation and sale abroad of competitive defense output may become a major article in Russian exports correcting its current orientation toward raw materials and may also serve as an important help in support of the required level of the domestic military-industrial base, which is threatened by destruction on account of the reduction of defense orders and the problem of nonpayments. As for the question of the limitation of the arms trade in the world and the supposedly destabilizing influence of Russia in this area, which Western "well-intentioned persons and helpers" are actively imposing on us, here the facts speak most eloquently. Thus, according to UN registers of conventional arms in 1992-93, the United States exported 261 combat aircraft and the FRG 106 (whereby 13 of them were Mig-23 and Mig-21 fighters and Su-22's that it got from the former National People's Army of the GDR). For Russia, this indicator was only about 70.

Taking into account the noted circumstance, the second lesson from the Mig deal is that our exporters have to fight

for the signing of contracts under the conditions of tough competition from Western weapons suppliers. And this fight has recently been becoming more and more intense because of the narrowing of the world military market. According to information from SIPRI, the volume of world imports of the main conventional arms systems declined by 54 percent in comparable prices over the period 1988-1992. Under these conditions, Western weapons producers experiencing serious problems because of reduced orders for their products from national armed forces and viewing the export of these products as a kind of "saving wand" are undertaking active and rather extraordinary measures to achieve victory in the competitive struggle for export contracts.

In particular, to prevent the achievement of an agreement on the delivery of Russian fighters to Malaysia and to "push through" its own combat aircraft, the United States reexamined its previous (rather restrained) policy with respect to the country in question, renewed the program for the provision of military assistance to it, and also significantly (by about 40 percent) reduced the price that it was originally asking for its F-16's and F-18's, making it close to that of the Migs. As a result, the Malaysian side signed a contract at the end of 1993 for the acquisition of eight F/A-18 combat aircraft from the United States, which will be delivered in 1997. In so doing, this deal will be realized in the scope of a special national program "Sale of Military Output Abroad" that provides for the appropriation of the corresponding funds from the national budget for the financing of the contracts included in it.

Besides the United States, Great Britain is also showing significant activity in the Malaysian aviation market. In the next two years, it is supposed to deliver 28 light "Hok-100/200" combat training aircraft to the country in question. The British side had to make a considerable effort for the 1990 signing of the contract for the export of these aircraft, including obligations for major investments in the development of the local military industry and reciprocal purchases of Malaysian goods.

For Russian exporters, the "breakthrough" in the Malaysian market was likewise not an easy measure and required intense work and significant expenditures. But in this area as well, we maintained our Russian "charm" in the creation of additional problems that are subsequently overcome heroically. Because of the ill-conceived reform of the previous system of military-technical cooperation with foreign states in 1991-92, Russia's interests in the Malaysian market for combat aircraft were represented by about 20 dubious intermediaries who put forward contradictory conditions and created difficulties in the importer's assessment of the real possibilities of our suppliers. The greatest absurdity in this connection was the fact that in the competitive fight for the order in question there was a clash of interests between two specialized foreign trade associations of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations ("Oboroneksport" and "Spetsvneshtekhnika"), each of which was working in concert with individual production subdivisions of the overall complex producing the Mig-29 fighters. The result, according to what has been determined, is that in our fighting each other we lost about a year until the government restored justice and established the exclusive rights of MAPO [Moscow Aviation

Production Association] and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to engage in foreign economic operations with the Mig-29.

Thus, the third lesson from the Malaysian deal can be formulated this way: to be successful in the foreign market under contemporary conditions, Russian arms exporters need to combine their efforts, because the greatest chances to obtain orders belong precisely to large structures or their alliances with the necessary marketing knowledge, experience, and resources, without which it is impossible to satisfy the requirements of demanding importers with respect to quality.

This lesson is very important for those Russian producers who are striving to obtain the rights to independent export of weapons in accordance with government decree No. 479 from 6 May 1994. Under the "cost-effectiveness" criterion, it is more rational for many producers of armaments and military hardware to cooperate with the state company "Rosvooruzheniye," whereby this would naturally be done on a mutually advantageous basis. Unfortunately, it is apparent that no one else has the data bases on sales markets and the infrastructure for the collection and analysis of information that MAPO and "Rosvooruzheniye" have.

The fourth lesson from the Malaysian deal may be considered to be the fact that unfortunately in the area of military exports there is still little attention being paid to the assessment and forecasting of the demand for new armament by potential customers and the determination of their individual requirements with respect to imported defense production. Thus, before Malaysia signed the contract on the delivery of Mig-29 fighters, it demanded their modification, including the increase in the service life of the engine from 750 to 2,000 hours, equipment of the aircraft with a new system for space communication and navigation and in-flight refueling system, and increase in the service time of the airframe and on-board equipment taking into account the humid Malaysian climate.

All of these conditions were accepted and certainly they will be performed.

In addition, one of the main problems facing Russian exporters, as the Malaysian deal also shows, is the question of payment for the export of defense production. Today's importers of arms, knowing what they are worth, actively demand reciprocal purchases of their commodities. Thus, Malaysia compensates for part of the cost of the Migs through deliveries of palm oil. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is no longer responsible for such purchases and therefore the domestic arms producers who are striving to sell their own output abroad must more actively seek new commercial structures that are working effectively in the corresponding commodity markets and involve them in such deals.

Extraordinary importance in the development of the exports of Russian arms is being attached to the state, which must guarantee favorable conditions for the establishment of competitive defense output and its sale abroad. This assistance must consist in the necessary financing of export projects, the provision of the necessary information to producers on the needs of the world military market, and assistance in demonstration shows and tests of our weapons.

In particular, considering the strategic importance of the Malaysian Mig deal for Russia as a whole and also the problem of nonpayments, a special preferential loan should be issued for this project and its expeditious total execution should be guaranteed. Otherwise it will be very difficult for the participants in this project to meet the rather tight deadlines. At the same time, consideration ought to be given to adjusting customs duties so as to preclude anecdotal situations in which after the corresponding payments to the state budget the producers of aircraft are left with just sandals or palm oil, for example, delivered as payment for our military equipment.

In this way, the development of the Malaysian deal shows that Russia has a significant potential in the area of the export of high-tech output but much still needs to be done for its full realization. And the more carefully that we analyze our previous experience and gain the necessary lessons, the faster we will reach our cherished goal—the flourishing of the Russian economy.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Glukhikh Comment on Future of Aviation Industry

95UM0026A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Viktor Glukhikh, chairman, Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry: "Russia Will Continue To Be a Great Aerospace Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our country's aerospace complex is experiencing difficult times today. The output of combat aircraft has been cut sharply, conversion programs are spinning their wheels, and much RDT&E has been frozen. And this in a country where aerospace science and production always were in the vanguard of technical progress, in a country which gave the world an entire galaxy of scientists, designers and engineers.

But I would like to be an optimist, for despite skeptics' gloomy forecasts, both aviation and space sectors retain their potential even in the present extremely unstable economic situation. Moreover, the majority of enterprises, design bureaus and scientific research institutes have found their niche in the market economy and continue to develop actively. Mastery of series production and certification of a new generation of Russian Il-96-300, Tu-204 and other passenger aircraft is graphic proof of this.

We do not plan to concede priorities in combat aircraft either. As shown by international exhibitions and air shows, our MiG and Sukhoy aircraft and our helicopters are fully competitive and enjoy great demand in the world arms market. And take missile-space systems—our country is the only one on the planet that has almost 20 years of experience in creating and operating long-term orbital stations. There is no doubt that Russia will continue to be a great aerospace power. We only have to seek and find new, modern, and at times nontraditional forms of organizing labor, enter vigorously into international cooperation, and advance aerospace equipment onto the world market even more persistently.

One would like to hope that the new newspaper will do its bit in solving these problems. I wish for it to acquire its look

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and its readers. I have no doubt that it will rally about itself all those to whom the destiny of Russian aviation and Russian space is dear.

MAPO Director Kuzmin Interviewed

95UM0025B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Kuzmin, general director of the Moscow Aviation Production Association, by Valentin Rudenko: "If There Is No Budgetary Financing, We Must Earn the Money Ourselves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the course of the last three decades, the main production of the Moscow Aviation Production Association [MAPO] was the fighters Mig-21, Mig-23, and Mig-29. In recent times, there has been a significant reduction of the production of Mig's in connection with the sharp reduction in appropriations for defense. It would seem that this circumstance ought to have driven the enterprise into an economic dead end and put it on the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. But unlike many other defense firms that found themselves in a similar situation, MAPO is confidently staying afloat. More than that, it is continuing to develop. What is the secret of this phenomenon? It was with this question that our correspondent began his conversation with Vladimir Kuzmin, general director of the association.

[Kuzmin] I do not think that there is anything phenomenal here. The hard times that have come for most defense enterprises are hard for us as well. It is simply that we probably understand before the others that under the conditions of the absence of budgetary financing it is necessary to earn money ourselves. And we became active in this direction.

As you know, our association produces one of the best fighters in the world—the Mig-29. There is a great deal of interest in this plane. Even our competitors recognize that in its piloting, operational, and some other parameters the Mig-29 not only is not inferior but is even superior to analogous foreign aircraft. And this means that it has good export chances. It would be a sin not to take advantage of this circumstance.

In the last two years, we delivered more than 30 aircraft abroad. This is actually what made it possible for us to remain afloat, as you say.

[Rudenko] MAPO is one of the leaders in the Russian defense industry with respect to participation in the world market. I would like you to go into more detail about the work that the association is doing in this direction.

[Kuzmin] When we analyzed the situation in the aviation market, we understood that if we want to become established in it and have, in a manner of speaking, our guaranteed niche, then we must offer not only a competitive product but also the conditions that would satisfy the interests and requirements of the most refined customer. In other words, we must accept those rules of the game that have long existed in this market.

We had no experience and we did not have the kind of ties that other Western firms have. And there was no name, despite the fact that the association has delivered more than

3,000 combat aircraft abroad. Nevertheless, thanks to persistence, flexibility, and professionalism, we established a special foreign-trade structure at the firm and we were able to penetrate the world aviation market. As a confirmation of this, take, for example, the latest contract for the delivery of 18 Mig-29's to Malaysia.

[Rudenko] Doubtless this contract was one of the most noticeable and significant not only for MAPO but also for our entire defense industry. Many domestic and foreign newspapers called it the "deal of the century" and a breakthrough by Russia into the arms markets of Southeast Asia. At the same time, there were doubts expressed about whether we will be able to fulfill it completely and on time. I would like to hear from you first hand how things really are.

[Kuzmin] The Malaysian contract was not easy for us to achieve. The fact is that essentially a secret tender was made on it. At the same time, our proposals were discussed and compared with the proposals of the Americans. But the specialists from our association, who worked in tandem with specialists from the state company "Rosvooruzheniye," were able to convince the Malaysian side that our proposals were preferable.

As for the question of whether or not we will fulfill the contract, we have no doubts about this—of course we will fulfill it. As of today, all technical and financial questions have already been resolved. Although, of course, we and our subcontractors will have to work well together to perform all of the conditions stipulated in the contract in time and in full.

[Rudenko] One of the components of the success of the export policy of MAPO was the fact that the association was offering its partners not only good fighters but also guaranteed servicing up to world standards.

[Kuzmin] Today we are indeed offering to our customer an entire complex of servicing and in the way that their Western partners do this. We are even establishing joint ventures and unique technical centers. And we are doing this not in search of profit—one cannot count on it initially—but to make a fundamental change in the situation in our favor.

But I would be violating the truth if I were to say that we have no problems with servicing. They will be resolved only when the enterprise supplying military hardware is granted the right to work directly with customers, by-passing all state and nonstate structures.

At the same time, in no way are we putting into question the state's monopoly in trading with weapons. I am convinced that the state must determine to whom we can sell, what we can sell, and how much, but the arms producers must do everything else themselves.

[Rudenko] This question is already being resolved at the governmental level. A special decree was issued under which the right to export defense output must be granted not only to special exporters but also to producers. As far as I know, MAPO intends to be among the first to receive this right.

[Kuzmin] MAPO, by the way, already has the right to independent foreign economic action. We just need to

affirm it in accordance with the new procedure. We submitted a request and presented all the necessary documents. In addition, we have shown in practice our readiness to perform this work.

[Rudenko] While emphasizing the export of combat aircraft, the association is actively involved in the diversification of production. The readers will be interested in your experience in this very complex matter.

[Kuzmin] The time when the association produced hundreds of combat aircraft a year are gone forever. We understood this a long time ago and took the course of producing civil aircraft, in particular the short-range [blizhnemagistralnoye] aircraft Il-114, the nine-seater "Grach," the ultralight "Aviatika," and others. But whereas we are able to handle an aircraft such as the "Grach" with our own internal reserves, things are more complicated with the Il-114 and our new program for the Mig-AT/UTC training aircraft. Here we cannot get along without centralized state investments. The state made a statement on conversion and it appears that it considered its mission to be ended with this. For this reason, all conversion programs that we are now pursuing will have to be financed from one source—the funds obtained from the sale of aircraft.

[Rudenko] MAPO is more and more actively calling itself the locomotive of the Russian industrial aviation complex. How do you see the future of the association?

[Kuzmin] I told myself a long time ago that they will help and support the one who is strong, the one who not only produces a product but also is capable of handling the project planning, manufacturing, testing, and delivery of aircraft to the consumer. This is the kind of strong structure that we are trying to become, bringing together and employing for this purpose the financial resources that we have, even if they are not very great. All of our subcontractors share and support our point of view on this. Today we have already taken practical steps to establish the kind of structure that we hope in the future will be a powerful scientific-financial-industrial group.

I do not doubt that sooner or later the time will come when everyone will once again understand that Russia cannot exist without aviation and when they will again turn to the building of aircraft.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Need Seen for Draft Law on Military Powers

954F0040A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by Yuriy Deryugin: "The Russian Army: The People's or 'His Majesty's'?", "The Lack of Control of the Armed Forces Fraught With Grave Consequences"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The September-October tragedy of 1993 in Moscow once again vividly demonstrated the most urgent need to create reliable legal and political mechanisms regulating the relations between parliament, as the highest organ of state power, and the Armed Forces, one of the main instruments of the state. This problem becomes especially timely when you consider that tanks not only fired on the young Russian parliament at point-blank range, but also

helped create the prerequisites for serious deformation (at the least) of the entire legislative base created by such effort in recent years.

Citizens Control Equal to Zero

As for the military law package, the main blow here fell on the Law "On Defense." The Presidential Order of December 21, 1993, eliminated article 4, i.e. the powers of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in the area of defense and use of the army. Another seven (articles 5, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 26) exceptionally important legal norms, creating the desired balance of powers of the authorities in the military sphere underwent significant cuts, at the cost of their very essence. Such excisions reduced practically to zero civilian control of the army, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops, and counterintelligence troops, creating all the conditions for the appearance of new, even more large-scale social conflicts. In fact, what sort of tranquility can there be in a society when sole power is concentrated in the hands of the head of state, and authority over all power structures, all the way up to the General Staff, is not restricted in any way?

The Shortest Path to Authoritarianism

Remember that any civilized democratic state is based on the principle of separation of powers, a system of checks and balances promoting harmony. This is elementary. Nonetheless our fatherland "democrats," measuring their personal and public life by western canons, pretend that they do not notice what is happening.

But remember at the dawn of the new democratic era, all the words spoken about the lack of control of the Soviet Armed Forces, remember the persistence with which the democratic press defended the idea of excluding the internal function of the army, of its depolitization? Quite recently Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was a "fan" of this idea too. But evidently the illness did not last long. The "recovery" began right after October 4, 1993.

The new military doctrine opened up the widest scope for the army to resolve political problems by force of arms, and turned it (under specific conditions) into an appendage of the MVD troops and OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] subunits. And already, proceeding from the radically renewed "theory" of military development, the structure of the troops located close to the capital is gradually changing: more and more VDV [Airborne], Spetsnaz [Special-Purpose Troops] and other subunits distinguished by their special mobility are appearing around it. Ultimately the impression is created that the Russian Army is being transformed from the people's to the "sovereign's." Why all this is being done must be obvious even to the dullest. It doesn't take great analytical talent to see how the new Constitution granting unlimited rights to the president, and the new military doctrine, strengthening the military-political props of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, are converging to a single point.

From this closely focused point, the path runs to authoritarianism and on to a monarchical dictatorship with all the ensuing consequences both for Russia and for all types of abroad.

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The first signs of czarist authority have already been manifested, and by no means in the appearance of state eagles, but in the creation of a special presidential regiment. There is also talk of a presidential guard (based on the Berlin Brigade). These power structures are of course not being formed to display the changing of the guard for passing tourists, as is done at London's Whitehall.

Based on what has been said, the restoration of the legal balance of all branches of government on military matters is becoming one of the primary tasks of society, if it still retains even the slightest glimmer of the instinct of self-preservation.

A Simple Truth

In this regard, it is apropos to recall the experience of parliamentary activity in the U.S. An imbalance of the system of separation of powers occurred there during the Vietnam War years. At the time the Americans clearly felt that the foreign-policy activity of President Richard Nixon threatened to go beyond the customary framework and be transformed into an "imperial presidency," an attempt at serious encroachment of legality and consequently of the parliamentary-democratic forms of government. To prevent this, the U.S. Congress adopted the so-called "War Powers Act," which in practice became the first in a series of serious legislative measures to restrict the president's power. I think that our State Duma might also draw such an analogy. The issue is not one of blind copying of the contents, but of the idea itself. Here the Law "On Defense" could comprise the basis for a new legislative document. Meanwhile, the supreme functions of Parliament control of procedures for the use of the Armed Forces abroad, of nuclear security, weapons programs, cadre policy of the military department, respect for the rights of service members and law and order in the units, precise legal guarantees, non-use of the army and MVD troops or counterintelligence organs for suppression of the people or political opponents, measures of responsibility in the case of military infringement of legitimate rights of any branch of government, the mechanisms for implementing these measures etc. might form the basic conceptual outlines of the Law in question.

Such logic, providing for the supremacy of control functions of the parliament, flows from the essence of the Constitution itself, which proclaims the people the sole source of power, which it implements chiefly through that collective state organ formed by the voters to effect the will of all the people. This simple truth must literally enter the pores of the national psychology if we want to call ourselves a democratic country.

Do We Need a Supreme Commander-in-Chief?

Speaking of a possible Law "On Military Powers," we cannot but consider the question of the status of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which the head of state automatically receives. Obviously this rank was rightly introduced during the Great Patriotic War. I do not deny that it was justified in the situation of sharp confrontation of two social systems. But now, when there is no clear-cut image of the enemy, when friendly relations have been established with former potential adversaries, when according to already settled opinion no one intends to

attack Russia, and it itself never intended to attack anyone, one wonders why the head of state should assume this post, which is by its nature authoritarian?

Why should Russia not show initiative and become the first to abandon this practice, thus confirming its desire for demilitarization of society, about which we are shouting from every street corner?

I think that abandonment of the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief would also help improve the public-opinion rating of the head of state. As for the search for a mechanism of change of the constitutional norm, this is a quite realistic matter if you consider all the ups and downs of our former constitutional process.

Reverence for Parliament

If we follow the experience of the majority of western countries, we have to acknowledge that Parliament always has the prerogative of developing the principles of defense policy by devising recommendations regarding the problems of implementing military doctrine and strategy, and has the right to hear the reports of the president regarding the provision of military aid to foreign states, and on the annual draft of the budget, including appropriations for military needs. The questions of the numerical strength of the Armed Forces, their command and organization, and determination of the periods of conscript and contract service as a rule are within the zone of parliamentary authority.

The experience of the youthful but already much-suffering Russian parliamentarianism shows that the levers of civilian control cannot be concentrated only at the highest stages of representative authority. The tragic October, 1993 testifies how important it is to have this control mechanism both at the level of the military department and directly in the units. For this, institutes of parliamentary representatives are needed in the very structure of the Defense Ministry (in England they are called parliamentary secretaries, who are raised to the level of deputy defense ministers) and special authorized agents functioning in the line units on a professional basis, but selected by the State Duma (similar experience exists in Germany). In both cases these persons must possess substantial rights and act in the name of the highest organ of people's authority. The defense representative of the *Bundestag*, for example, in terms of social law is comparable in position to a federal minister, and can demand official inquiries, reports and documents from the military department and its subordinate service levels. He can grant the opportunity to competent organs to settle cases involving the violation of the rights of service members, can demand intervention, up to initiation of criminal proceedings, and can visit all units, staffs, and organs of the *Bundeswehr* and their institutions etc. without prior notification.

It seems to me that it is important for the State Duma to use the military legal reform mentioned by Boris Yeltsin in his first message to parliament to create these institutions.

Incidentally, speaking of the use of western experience, toward which the pillars of our social democracy are so respectful, we cannot ignore the constant concern of the troop command of the NATO armed forces to instill in

service members a sense of reverence for parliament as the highest organ of people's authority, a synthesizing symbol of democracy in general.

"What will you do if you are ordered to shoot on the Capitol?"—I will immediately arrest my commander."

This stereotypical question and answer is instilled in the consciousness of American soldiers almost daily, not by Congress or the president, but by the military commanders themselves.

The Service Members Await Specific Solutions

The success of activity of any parliament lies in close communication with the people. Disregard of this golden rule by representative authority is fraught with serious consequences, for it has no other means of protection beyond public opinion and the comprehensive support of the populace. What is more, "will formation," i.e. active influence on the population through open discussion of decisions, reports on accomplishment of election platforms by parliamentary factions etc., is the inalienable direct function of parliament. Service members are no exception to the general rule. The complete closure of the garrisons from any outside view, particularly from the view of members of parliament, naturally has nothing in common with democracy. For this reason the iron curtain that now conceals the life of the units and subunits must be removed. Only full openness of the military sphere can ensure the resolution of army and navy problems. I think that this question has long been ripe for special consideration in the Duma.

Sociological studies show that service members await legal measures from the highest organ of people's authority that would help enhance the social prestige of the army, halt the division of units into elite and non-elite, ensure the use of the Armed Forces only against a foreign aggressor, improve the methods of manpower acquisition, strengthen social and legal protection, and raise the material well-being of the armed defenders of the Fatherland.

In regard to the last, further improvement of the Law "On the Status of the Service Members" is especially important. Expert analysis of the norms and concepts contained in it suggests that this legislative act may be divided into two independent legal acts, "On the Status of Service Members" and "On the Benefits of Service Members." Such a division gives us an opportunity to expand the legal space of the first document and introduce the necessary profound correctives to the second.

Where Should the State Duma Begin?

Speaking of urgent problems in today's parliamentary activity, we cannot help but note that the chief slowing mechanism in the creation of the legal basis of the defense sphere is the gap between legislative activity and military reform, whose rate of conduct is tending to slow while its method of action tends towards the roll-back. Given this situation, the legal basis in question is doomed to instability, rapid obsolescence, and ineffectiveness, when the laws cease to exist before they have entered into force. This is why an independent, profound analysis of the state of the army, the entire military sphere, and the process of their

reformation is exceptionally important. It is perhaps important that the present State Duma begin its approach to the army from this point. And the firmer the subsequent steps, the more quickly it will acquire the recognition and support of the whole army, which is today also experiencing hard times because it has spawned the punishers of people's authority in its ranks.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Problems in Withdrawing 14th Russian Army From Moldova

Political Aspects Viewed

954Q0026A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 8 Oct 94 p 3

Article by Georgiy Romashov: "The Ministry of Defense Does Not Want To Pull Chestnuts Out of the Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problem of withdrawing the 14th Russian Army from the Dniester region is becoming more and more difficult to solve. During recent days, Mircea Snegur, the president of Moldova who has expressed hope that the army would be withdrawn over three years, and Igor Smirnov, the leader of the Dniester region who stated that the army, on the whole, cannot be withdrawn from the region, have exchanged statements. It cannot be ruled out that a third force—General Lebed—will step in to solve the question.

Immediately after the signing this summer of the Russian-Moldovan agreement on the legal status, procedure, and time frames for the Russian forces' withdrawal, Aleksandr Lebed stated that it is impossible to withdraw the army. In his opinion, the best solution to the problem would be the establishment of a military base based on the army.

The main obstacle to this is Moldova's Constitution, which forbids the stationing of armed forces from other states on its territory. However, officers from Lebed's circle have announced to correspondent "B" that this does not frighten the commander. According to their calculations, the pro-Russian part of the Moldovan parliament will not begin to put obstacles in the way of establishing this base and the number of supporters of this idea could even grow since the parliamentarians will fear that some of the weapons will pass into the hands of the Dniester region authorities. The military consider Mircea Snegur's position a serious obstacle. That is why it cannot be ruled out that they will begin a campaign to discredit him although Lebed's capabilities on the Dnieper's right bank are not as great as those in the Dniester region.

Snegur speaks very favorably about Lebed. During a recent interview with Western journalists, he rated the commander's activity highly. He must see in Lebed a counterweight to the unpredictable leadership in the Dniester region and fears that the hands of the Dniester region authorities will be untied after the army withdraws—this outweighs his reluctance to leave Russian forces in the region. This gives Lebed an additional trump card.

Seemingly, the Dniester region leaders still do not know where to concentrate their efforts. After the unsuccessful attempt to rid themselves of the army commander, they sometimes talk about the impossibility of withdrawing the

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army and sometimes they allow it; however, they demand that the weapons and equipment be left in place.

In the situation that is taking shape, only Moscow is remaining calm. Its indifference to the idea of establishing a military base in an extremely important strategic region (especially in connection with the prospects of NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe) is causing bewilderment and indignation among the officers in the 14th Army. Evidently, the leadership of the military department is simply biding its time, not wishing to communicate anymore with Lebed and believing that his failure and the army's withdrawal will in no way reflect on the Ministry of Defense's reputation but the army commander's victory will permit a military base to be picked up without any effort.

Commentary on Regional Stability

954Q0026B Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 8 Oct 94 p 3

[Commentary by the International Life Department: "Commentary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is the 14th Army needed in Moldova from the viewpoint of regional stability? Evidently far from the degree to which it was previously. The main irritant of international conflict that caused the Transdniestrian war—militant pro-Romanian nationalism—has neither political force nor social support in Chisinau. Geopolitics is another matter. Here, it is necessary to determine what means should be used to assure the security of the CIS western borders—by means of Russia's direct military presence or within the framework of a CIS collective security treaty (however, one does not formally contradict the other). One cannot fail to take into account the fact that the 14th Army is the westernmost of Russia's military forces. Evidently, that is why the United States has repeatedly expressed its "anxiety" about its presence in Moldova. Moreover, in the case of the 14th Army, one must also consider a fact that is purely domestic: A large portion of its 15,000-strong contingent have solidly taken root for a long time in the beneficial Moldovan soil.

Finally, the last factor. Besides the vagueness in where to withdraw the 15,000 soldiers, the removal of General Lebed himself from Moldova is no less complicated a problem for the Russian Ministry of Defense. It will be necessary to rack one's brains over what to do with this politically powerful figure. However, as they say, in three years either the padishah will die or the donkey will die.

SECURITY SERVICES

Two Views on Russian Border Security

95UM0017A Moscow POGRANICHNIK in Russian
No 6, Jun 1994 [Signed to press 24 Apr 94] pp 14-22

[Articles by political scientist N. Kosolapov and economist A. Rassadin under "Point of View" rubric: "Where To Guard the Borders of Russia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

In the society, in the mass media, and at all sorts of conferences and symposiums, heated arguments periodically arise about how the borders of Russia should be and where

and how to guard them. And this is understandable—the structure of the state is being established and therefore that of its borders as well. Hence the interest of the Russians in the problem at hand. And where there are disputes, there will naturally be differences of opinion and polar views and arguments.

We propose that you "listen" to two "voices" from this chorus of opinions. We must stipulate that the publication of the articles by political scientist N. Kosolapov and economist A. Rassadin, scientific colleagues at the World Economics and International Relations Institute, does not mean that the editor's office necessarily shares the point of view of the authors. These are independent judgments and it is up to the readers to judge how correct or subjective they are.

Nikolay KOSOLAPOV, candidate of historical sciences

As a political scientist, I naturally cannot and do not intend to advise the border guards where their "bayonets" actually should be positioned: professionals can better determine that. I see my task as that of trying to outline the political aspects of the problem of the national border of the new sovereign Russia.

First of all, there is no question that the border needs to be guarded. The transparency of the borders does not mean their absence and it is not the absence of a system for their guarding and protection. Transparency is a system and means of security that would create a minimum of interference and inconvenience for all legal cross-border exchanges, relations, and conveyances. And at the same time, it would be much more effective than the traditional "locked border" in protecting the interests of the state and society under the conditions of their being substantially more open to the outside world. We stress that it is a forced and necessary openness, for the renunciation of such openness would ultimately cost us much more than the expenditures with which it (just as everything else in life) is linked.

But where and how to guard [the border] depends on precisely what is meant by a border and against what it is being guarded and for what purpose. In principle, obviously, there may be three levels of security: (a) along the line of the border itself or along some other politically determined line, (b) at border points in the interior of the country—such points as international airports, and (c) at those lines and in those regions where we are able to put adequate and effective forces and counteracting means against some real or potential infringement of our border.

Still, apparently, the key element in the concept of a border is not its line but in practical terms the limits of the sovereignty of the state and the forms in which sovereignty itself and its limits are expressed. The border is the boundary between that space in which no one can challenge the sovereignty and authority of the state without thereby violating the law and the space in which this sovereignty and this authority knowingly end and may be disputed by others on a legal basis.

A delimited or demarcated line is just the symbol of such a boundary. And therefore the guarding of the border—in the practical sense of both of these words—with all of its undoubted necessity and importance is in itself still not the definitive means of protecting the interests of the state in its

relations with the outside world. Meanwhile, the very most important and most painful question for Russia at the present time and for the foreseeable future is how to defend not so much the line of our border as our own interests and even what specifically these interests are.

Finally, it is not the state that is derived from its border but the border from the state. Its real course is determined—as the boundary of sovereignty and as the line designating this boundary—by the practical competence of the state. Political agreements with contiguous countries only formalize the results of this competence. Actually delimitation is the joint and mutual recognition by neighboring states of the limits of each other's competence.

In the past, such competence was tested by forceful confrontations. The borders of the former USSR and its predecessor the Russian Empire were established in precisely this way, whether this took place in the 17th, 19th, or 20th centuries. World War II was the last test of the competence of the USSR by force. At the present time, world practice rejects the establishment or changing of borders by force but this does not mean that the competence of the state is not tested continually in the world arena. Only now one of the main criteria for these tests is the ability of the state to maintain the necessary and desirable order within itself. And under this criterion, Russia now objectively finds itself in by no means the best shape and hence this is provoking others to infringe on its interests.

Therefore, a primary task of Russian policy at the present time is to demonstrate as convincingly as it can through several specific examples that Russia understands its own interests and is able to guarantee their protection. It seems to me that if this can be done it will noticeably facilitate the task of guarding the borders and many other things as well.

It must be recognized that psychologically we are in many ways still living under the influence of what we were accustomed to and what we took for granted in the former USSR, including with respect to the border. Then the line of the border and the reasons and objectives of its guarding and protection—against a clearly defined potential enemy and against illegal violations from within—were extremely clear. But today Russia does not have the kind of borders that the USSR had and this must not be, for it does not need them.

Above all, for a considerable part of the border, this was a "dotted line" of confrontation, of direct and indirect contact with the potential enemy, a "dotted line" of the most intense and constant military-political opposition that frequently threatened to become a military confrontation. The border was mined in the direct sense of the word and shrouded in obstacles in a strip separating sides that if they were not warring then at least they were prepared to war against each other. Essentially it was a front line during peacetime. Clearly the military and political status must be seen as different now.

In addition, the border of the USSR was actually a border of isolation from the outside world. Exchanges in both directions were limited and reduced to a minimum. The Russian border must first be oriented toward the prospect of a continuous and substantial increase in all flows across it,

both legal flows and, as is inevitable under the conditions of inclusion in the world economy, illegal flows as well.

Also of fundamental importance is the fact that previously the countries on the other side of the boundaries of the USSR were "foreign" countries and peoples. Some of them were our friends, some were neutral, and some were potential enemies. But all of them were "foreign." Now millions of our "own" people, Russians as well as other citizens of the former USSR, have found themselves beyond the borders. This noticeably changes an entire complex of political, psychological, and other factors having to do with the problem of the population's recognizing new borders and with the selection of the forms and means of providing for their security. And it thereby changes things in a very inconsistent way. In some places, the people cannot take the border seriously and in others something like an "insult" arises—they wanted it and now they have it!

Finally, the border of the USSR was extremely rigid in every way. Its immutability was incorporated in all international political treaties and agreements involving this matter. Accordingly, the guarding and defense of the border were set up if not for a century then at least for decades. Clearly, the border of Russia with parts of the former USSR, while remaining politically and legally immutable, must remain flexible in the practical area. In some places, it will be necessary to convert it into something like the border of the USSR, in some places they will set up customs controls, in some places they will strictly monitor the movements of people, and in some places they will take measures to isolate armed conflicts. It is possible that in some places it will be necessary to reduce such measures or to change their proportions when the need has passed.

We no longer have the accustomed uniformity of the "sacred and inviolable" [border] along its entire course. Where Russia inherited the borders of the former USSR, its line remains the same, as does its internationally recognized and properly formalized status and installations. But even here, apparently, much is changing. It is not just that in many cases unprecedented flows of people and freight have crossed such cordons. Today there are no countries that we would call a potential enemy but neither are there any allied countries. This means that there has been a noticeable expansion of the "gray" zone, where quite possibly there will be a need to adjust the system and means of guarding the border depending on events in adjacent countries and regions and on subtle swings in the conditions of Russia's political relations with them.

An entire complex of interrelated and complex problems have arisen where the new state borders of the Russian Federation coincide with the previous lines of the administrative delimitation of the union and autonomous republics of the former USSR.

First of all, the origin of these borders is random and arbitrary. Difficult disputes may arise in their international legal delimitation even under the most favorable circumstances. Such disputes may be provoked artificially, including by third countries. In very many cases, there are no objective historical, cultural, or other bases for delimitation. Complex and, in many cases probably, lengthy negotiations will be required, which under the conditions of the acute internal political struggle going in each of the former

union republics will almost certainly become the hostage of this struggle. And as long as there is no agreement between the directly interested sides, one cannot count on the international legal recognition of the borders between the parts of the former USSR.

Of course all of these problems are resolvable in principle. Moreover they must be resolved without fail, because no state can live normally and look after its own interests without having fully delimited borders. But the forcing of this resolution under the present conditions would only increase the risk of conflicts and confrontations and would lead to the formation of an unstable, tense, and potentially explosive situation on the boundaries of Russia for decades. The outside world would receive a wonderful opportunity to play on these contradictions. And beyond that, the accumulated experience indicates that it is quite desirable from the outset to settle with near neighbors on a broad range of economic, social, and humanitarian questions.

Hence the fundamental expediency of the collective guarding of the border along the external perimeter of the CIS by all countries interested in this. The world is familiar with such a tactic: this is the structure of the border, customs, and immigration security of the European Union and North America (United States plus Canada). But such a version also has problems of its own for Russia and the CIS.

Above all the Russian border troops find themselves in a fundamentally new situation for them. The novelty is not only and not so much in the fact that in a number of cases they are forced essentially to operate beyond the boundaries of the country, separated from Russian territory. In my view, more essential is the fact that under these conditions they objectively must perform a function that was formerly assigned to the armed forces of the former Union—the projection of the military might of the country beyond the limits of its national borders. I cannot judge whether the border troops of Russia are prepared to perform this function (the course of events in Tajikistan allows one to assume that they are not very prepared to do this). But it is clear that if such a function is assigned to them from this point on, then the border troops must be adequately equipped to carry it out materially as well as legally.

The experience of the West European and especially North American zones indicates whether the security of the border is really the concern of the state for which this is more necessary for some reason or other than for the rest. Russia in the boundaries of the CIS is in a similar situation and this must be recognized. At the present time and in the foreseeable future, moreover, the maximum threats to the national security of Russia come and will come from the near rather than from the far abroad. Beyond that, in many cases the presence of Russian border troops in the external outposts of the CIS may help to prevent the rise of local conflicts and confrontations. In other words, the fact that Moscow will take on a significant share of the functions in the guarding of the external borders of the CIS has some "pluses," especially if one considers that in practice this frequently means the preservation of the line and material equipment of the national border of the former USSR.

But this variant also has some serious "minuses" that require careful, frank, and, to the extent possible, public preliminary analysis. The main minus is that the Russian

border troops and, along with them, Mother Russia may be drawn into local wars, whereby the local authorities, themselves being unable to handle the situation, may even quietly encourage or provoke such an involvement of the big northern brother on their side of the conflict. But it is one thing to protect the borders of the CIS against truly external infringements and quite another thing to be the involuntary ally of one of the sides in a civil war in a member state of the CIS. Russia cannot and must not act as the actual guarantor of the maintenance of any elite in power in the countries of the CIS: the form and composition of the government is the internal affair of the sovereign state, this being the main characteristic of its factual independence.

Another and no less serious "minus" for Russia has to do with the fact that such an involvement of Russia in local civil wars and local conflicts may take place simultaneously in several sectors in both the European and Asian parts of the country. But is Russia prepared to wage two or three "Afghan wars" simultaneously, can it do this, and does it need to do this? The situation of "two fronts," which we avoided in the years of World War II and the cold war, may arise and materialize in the most unexpected and delicate way. Here is where a preliminary clear analysis is needed: Is Russia prepared to become militarily involved if events move it in this direction and, if so, under what conditions, with what specific objectives, and to what limits?

Obviously where the corresponding CIS member countries show an interest and a capability to cooperate with Moscow in the joint guarding of the external border of the CIS, it is expedient to emphasize this under the condition of the transparency of the border between Russia and the state in question. Where there is no certainty about the interest and capability of our partner and especially where there is a great risk of an internal civil war, particularly with the prospect that it could be internationalized, it is necessary to have a complex of insurance measures directly at the Russian border.

Clearly as soon as possible we need to get rid of the concept of the border as the perimeter of the territory and leave behind the psychology that flows out of such an understanding: guard the perimeter and have equally tight control everywhere. Today some of the borders of Russia may not need to be guarded at all (for example, the border with Belarus—I do not assert this but only assume it). It may be that others need to be "sealed" more strongly than at the time of the "cold war." Certainly the guarding of the border within the country needs to be expanded and not just at international airports, whose number will increase, but also through a more complex system of visas and more rigid control at the places of first entry into the territory of the CIS, through systems for social insurance and bank clearing operations, and other nontraditional channels.

Let us be realistic. There is not a single country in the world that makes its borders 100 percent impermeable. This means that it is necessary to set priorities: precisely what are we guarding against, what means, measures, actions, and conditions are necessary for this, what are the channels and means for the penetration of real and potential threats, and where and how can and must we oppose such threats? Under today's conditions, the guarding of the national border only along the perimeter is become less and less adequate and the

demand for more effective security means that it must be supplemented more and more within the country and become an integral part of the very organization of the territory, economy, social sphere, and infrastructure. It may seem paradoxical but only this will make it possible to make the borders truly transparent and protected.

It seems to me that under today's conditions it is especially important that in the final analysis it is not the border as such and as a goal in itself that must be guarded but the state and society and their interests. Hence what is needed is a total system to secure the interests of the country that is broader and more comprehensive than merely guarding the border and even a system for national security, because the choice of a specific formula for the security of the border also depends not least on how effective are other channels and means that the state has for protecting its own interests and whether they even exist at all.

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We live in a time of paradoxes. They pursue us in everyday life, appear in the public arena, and do not by-pass the political sphere either. Apparently this is the destiny of every transition period.

The present borders of Russia or, more accurately, their actual absence are one of these paradoxes. Everyone knows that there can be no state without borders. Our country, considering the breaches in the border regions with former union republics, represents such a "transparent space" that it is appropriate to speak of its transparency as the object of systematic state action. Such a position endangers the realization above all of market reforms, creates favorable conditions for abuses and open theft, and leads to an outflow of significant financial and material resources. One can dispute the size of the losses but there is no doubt that they seriously influence the normal life of the country.

It is difficult and incorrect to define such consequences as economic only—they carry an enormous charge of political instability. The lack of borders is directly linked with the problem of the integrity of the state. Today inadequately defined forms of Russian federalism and the striving for "high ceilings" for the sovereignties of several of the subjects of the federation are provoking separatist moods in radical nationalistic circles. The example of the events in the North Caucasus region shows that in combination with the lack of control of border regions informal organizations are capable of carrying out unhindered rather large-scale military and political actions that are an alternative to the policies of Moscow. All of this weakens the vertical structure of state authority and pushes the country toward the critical point of its possible disintegration. The inadequate resolution of questions having to do with the national border is also creating tension in relations between states, is making the adherents of territorial disputes more fervent, and is exacerbating the potential for conflict in many border problems.

Thus, it would seem that the situation is extremely clear: there is a state and under the conditions of an unstable environment it must have borders that are appropriately equipped. But is this the case under the existing conditions? Today's border seemingly sets forth the fait accompli of the disintegration of the common country. The current border

passes through human fates and between close friends and families and peoples of one nationality. We can find many "comforting" analogies in the world in which similar problems are resolved in the most civilized manner but the specific nature of our still common space is such that there are quite a few objective reasons for the dramatic consequences of such a step.

Obviously we can argue about the wording but the essence is still that for historical and contemporary political and economic reasons the countries of the CIS are the zone of the direct vital interests of Russia. And this interest is mutual, because for them it is more a means of survival. A geopolitical space that developed over centuries under the conditions of the vital activities of one state possesses a great deal of inertia toward the preservation of unity and the unification of political and economic mechanisms. Russia was and remains the natural center of gravity and core of this space and the guarantor of its development.

The collapse of the USSR meant for its people above all the burial of an empire, the breaking of relations with the metropolis, and new possibilities for national self-determination. But in the Soviet period there was no metropolis as a quite specific place on the map: there was the so-called Center for the political leadership of the country through communist methods and that was all. Under this system, all of the republics, including the Russian republic, could equally be seen as colonies. With the fall of communism, the Center also disappeared and this means the metropolis as well. But in the eyes of the new sovereigns and of those still wanting to come into existence, this empty space (obviously, taking into account the size and potential) was replaced by Russia. And this represents still another great paradox of this time. Having taken responsibility for the foreign obligations of the USSR as its successor, Russia involuntarily got ensnared in the obligations already imposed on it—payments on the accounts of the past Soviet leadership. It is precisely to it that claims are now being made as to the metropolis and willingly or unwillingly the Center again turned out to be in Moscow. The range of these claims from economic support to guarantees of internal stability itself speaks of the actual recognition of Russia's leading role and consequently of the necessity of reciprocal ties expressed primarily in a well-conceived staged strategy of the country in the near abroad. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that Russia's losses from the political and economic disintegration are very substantial. In assessing them in the longer term, it is necessary to keep in mind that in the event of a significant lagging behind of the contiguous countries on the way to reforms there will be a real rupture of the now unified space, which will create an even more unfavorable situation for Russia.

At the same time, as can be seen in the results of the establishment of a state structure in neighboring countries, at the present time practically none of them has a serious potential for independent development. Any attempts with respect to the desire to distance themselves from Russia lead to severe economic and political consequences and frequently to exactly the opposite results. The basic and most alarming phenomenon of the present situation is the dramatic worsening of their internal political circumstances. They have recently been attaining a frankly threatening nature, whereby it is a not only a matter of a threat to the

survival of these countries themselves. The situation is so dangerous that it is capable of spreading and crossing the Russian boundaries and of provoking a chain reaction of destabilization in the former borders of the USSR. Its basic cause is the extremely acute economic crisis being experienced by practically all of the former union republics. The crisis has led to large-scale social conflicts, which complicated and exacerbated a whole series of other conflicts, including interethnic disputes. In the warring countries of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan, where there is civil war, the situation has reached a critical point in which the state is not able to provide its citizens with the conditions for even minimal consumption. In this connection, one must note a major increase in the influence of forces that are trying to lead a movement for the reintegration of the space of the former USSR under the slogan of unification with Russia. In combination with the results of the recent elections in the Russian Federation, they should be viewed as a clear threat to replace the process of civilized interstate integration with the forced restoration of the previous union relations. It is also obvious that this is a growing movement that has encompassed practically all the countries of the CIS and is capable of influencing the internal political situation in Russia itself.

The leadership of the former republics of the USSR is also seeking salvation in the establishment of closer ties with Russia, whereby in a number of cases it is even at the expense of the partial loss of national sovereignty. This was reflected in the joining of the CIS by Azerbaijan and Georgia and their signing of a treaty on collective security, the change in the positions of Ukraine in the scope of the Commonwealth, and the resurgence of the striving to restore the previous boundaries of the ruble zone.

In dwelling on these facts of contemporary political development, one should keep in mind that on the basis of the developing new interstate relations there is a quietly growing potential for integration of another kind. In this way, despite the existence of directly contradictory tendencies, we see a mutual gravitation of the former republics of the USSR toward the maintenance of close reciprocal ties and a more and more apparent predominance of centripetal trends in the activities of social and political forces and state administration.

There has recently been more and more pressure on the political and military leadership of the country in connection with various forms of Russian isolationism and especially so among the opponents of the military involvement of Russia in peripheral conflicts within the CIS. Neither the geopolitical position of the country nor the special character of relations with the former union republics and the situation there nor the 25 million Russian-speaking citizens leave any possibility for the pursuance of anything other than an active policy, a policy capable of exercising a stabilizing influence on the processes taking place there, which is in full accordance with the security interests of Russia and these states. In future practice, however, it is important not to exceed the limits of what is reasonable, when Russia could cease to be perceived by its present partners as their only natural ally and basic guarantor of their political survival.

Thus the establishment of new national boundaries simultaneously is turning out to mean the necessity of the joint

overcoming of the consequences of the rupture of economic and political ties. In other words, reintegration. Again a paradox. It is nevertheless quite obvious that the development of the borders without a flexible border system answering the specific needs of interstate as well as interregional relations will not lead to a reasonable solution but will only complicate the existing situation. What does this mean above all? It is no secret that no effective integration within the old boundaries is possible without Russia. In accordance with the above-mentioned reasons, however, not all possible forms of association are suitable for the Russian Federation either. In other words, the problem of the borders must be resolved in the framework of the basic task of national security: contribute to the successful implementation of the economic and political reforms in the country. The overall crisis situation is inevitably imposing quite definite limitations on the possibility of their realization. For this reason, any attempt to preserve the regime of transparent borders without the corresponding stringent reciprocal settlement of the bases for economic, social, political, and military-political activities is to conserve today's state of affairs, the deplorable result of which may be the task of establishing an effective boundary line along the perimeter of Russia.

Many of the enumerated problems must and can be resolved in the scope of the CIS. At the present time, with the obvious weakness of this organization, the Commonwealth has at least two rather promising instruments—the developing economic union and the treaty on collective security, which also are capable of outlining the basic general approaches to the development of the borders of Russia. The dramatic change in the position of states that previously were not inclined to seek close cooperation with Russia, even to the point of their signing a treaty on collective security, as in Georgia, for example, Ukraine's acceptance of the idea of an economic union, and the persistent striving of Belarus to join the ruble zone indicate major changes in the overall political composition in the direction of a rapprochement. This circumstance cannot fail to influence the manner of the resolution of border problems as well.

One cannot close his eyes to the fact that the growing instability in the countries of the Commonwealth has at least two alarming aspects. The first is the immediate threat of disintegration, which is inherent in most of our partners in the CIS, although to different degrees. The second aspect is the closely related threat directly to Russian interests, being expressed in the loss of control over the external border zone, the criminal importation of arms and narcotics, and the uncontrolled activity of third forces striving to internationalize conflicts for the purpose of expanding their spheres of influence. This mostly involves the borders adjacent to the most unstable zone along a north-south line. It is obvious that in the case at hand there is a coincidence of domestic national interests with the national security interests of our neighbors. Therefore, along with the logic of the collective defense of the common economic space, it likewise appears quite legitimate for Russia to participate in the joint guarding of the border. One thereby resolves not only Russia's own problems but also the tasks of preserving the state structure and territorial integrity of allied countries. A positive example of such cooperation was the agreement on the status and conditions of the functioning of

the Border Troops of the Russian Federation located in the territory of Georgia. There is no doubt about the validity of the fears with respect to the concomitant material expenditures and the threat of Russia's being drawn into regional conflicts. But if one compares the agreed shared participation in the financing of service in existing border regions with the otherwise inevitable development of a new border, then the savings is obvious. As for involvement in conflicts, the status of the border troops is strictly defined by the articles of the agreement and secondly the very fact of the strengthening of the external border significantly reduces the probability of the expansion of conflicts to the point where coercive force is dictated by vital interests and it facilitates the resolution of problems by political means.

Nevertheless, all of this cannot resolve all of the tasks in connection with the numerous threats emanating from the internal political instability of our neighbors and in Russia itself. Therefore, in the event of a dramatic worsening of the situation in some border region of the near abroad, measures to cut off and localize the zone of the conflict are called for. It is a matter of the establishment of unique temporary boundary lines resolving problems dictated by the specific nature of the situation at hand. This may be a situation analogous to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict or one that has other causes. For example, relations with Ukraine had

and will have a special status for Russia but the nature of the border regime between the two states must rest on the realities of the political course of the Ukrainian leadership and must have the potential for an adequate reaction to a change in it, especially since the precedent has been set of consuming gas intended for Western Europe at Russia's expense.

At the same time, the acquired status of associated member in the Economic Union, reinforced through the corresponding contractual obligations, must contribute to the triumph of civilized forms of interstate relations.

The borders with states that did not join the CIS (provided that this is not stipulated by special agreements) cannot differ from the customary borders with any foreign power.

Recent events have confirmed once again the important peculiarity of our time characterized by rapid change in the situation and the adjustment of the political positions of states. It is in the interests of Russia, as the essential core of the genuine and civilized integration of the states of the former USSR, to have a developed strategic concept for the future integrated space that all can understand, on the basis of which practical policy is to be built, including with respect to border problems.

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